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I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite rising media coverage and public awareness, the opioid crisis 
continues to outpace efforts to mitigate its harms.1 The Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention most recently estimated that drug overdoses took 70,237 
lives in 2017, an increase of almost ten percent over the previous year, with 
nearly 48,000 of such deaths attributable to opioids.2 While illicit opioids are 
 
 † Rebecca L. Haffajee, JD, PhD, MPH, is a policy researcher at RAND Corporation 
and an adjunct assistant professor of health management and policy at the University of 
Michigan School of Public Health. She practiced regulatory health care law and now 
evaluates the public health impacts of behavioral health policies, including those targeting 
opioids. 
 ‡ Michael R. Abrams, JD, is a 2019 graduate from the University of Michigan Law 
School currently serving as a judicial law clerk. 
 1 See Allison L. Pitt et al., Modeling Health Benefits and Harms of Public Policy 
Responses to the US Opioid Epidemic, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1394, 1398 (2018) (modeling 
policy impact to find that “[f]or some policies and time horizons, the increase in heroin--
related deaths may exceed the reduction in opioid pill-related addiction deaths, despite 
overall gains in quality of life”); Max Blau, STAT Forecast: Opioids Could Kill Nearly 
500,000 Americans in the Next Decade, STAT (June 27, 2017), https://www.statnews. 
com/2017/06/27/opioid-deaths-forecast/ [https://perma.cc/6BRS-C7UA] (averaging 
expert forecasts of opioid overdose deaths to conclude that the peak of the crisis has not 
passed). 
 2 Drug Overdose Deaths, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/statedeaths.html  [https://perma.cc/FYU9-M3 
D7] (last updated June 27, 2019). 
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responsible for a growing share of opioid overdose deaths,3 many individuals’ 
opioid misuse and addiction originated from prescription painkiller use.4 A 
concerning overlap between prescription opioid and illicit opioid use exists, 
such that “the prescription opioid epidemic could at least double the number of 
heroin users in the United States by 2025.”5 
The crisis’s historic rates of addiction and overdose have prompted a 
panoply of legal and public health responses. Federal and state administrative 
agencies have prioritized monitoring, enforcement, spending programs related 
to opioid prescribing, and, more recently, addiction treatment.6 Law 
enforcement agencies are acting in tandem in the criminal realm, prosecuting a 
mix of defendants, including corporate executives, pharmaceutical retailers, 
physicians, pharmacists, and persons with opioid addiction.7 Nonprofit 
 
 3 See Puja Seth et al., Overdose Deaths Involving Opioids, Cocaine, and 
Psychostimulant—United States, 2015−2016, 67 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 349, 349 (2018). The most significant 
contributor to the rise in opioid deaths was notoriously dangerous synthetic opioids like 
fentanyl, followed by heroin. Id. at 350–51, 352, 353. “Fentanyl, an opioid 80 times more 
potent than heroin, was brought to market in the United States as Duragesic® by Janssen 
Pharmaceuticals. . . . In the early 1990s, drug dealers began mixing fentanyl with heroin to 
produce a greater high. . . . By 2016, [for example,] half of overdose deaths in Illinois were 
fentanyl-related.” Richard D. deShazo et al., Backstories on the US Opioid Epidemic. Good 
Intentions Gone Bad, an Industry Gone Rogue, and Watch Dogs Gone to Sleep, 131 AM. J. 
MED. 595, 599 (2018) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 4 See Rebecca L. Haffajee & Michelle M. Mello, Drug Companies’ Liability for the 
Opioid Epidemic, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2301, 2301 (2017) (citing RICHARD J. BONNIE ET 
AL., NAT’L ACAD. SCIS., PAIN MANAGEMENT AND THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC: BALANCING 
SOCIETAL AND INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS AND RISKS OF PRESCRIPTION OPIOID USE (2017)); 
JONAKI BOSE ET AL., KEY SUBSTANCE USE AND MENTAL HEALTH INDICATORS IN THE UNITED 
STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2017 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH 20–22 
(2018). 
 5 BONNIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 213–14.  
 6 See generally The Federal Response to the Opioid Crisis: Hearing Before the S. 
Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions Comm., 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Dr. Francis 
Collins, Director, National Institutes of Health) (describing how federal agencies, including 
HHS, SAMHSA, CDC, NIH, and FDA, are responding to the crisis). See also Stephen 
Barlas, U.S. and States Ramp Up Response to Opioid Crisis, 42 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 
569, 569 (2017) (noting that state agencies “have been just as active” as federal ones, 
expanding prescription monitoring and access to overdose-reversal medication).  
 7 See, e.g., Rachel L. Rothberg & Kate Stith, The Opioid Crisis and Federal Criminal 
Prosecution, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 292, 295–97 (2018) (describing DEA and DOJ criminal 
prosecutions related to opioids, including the criminal case of Purdue Pharma executives, 
and other cases against medical providers); Y. Tony Yang & Rebecca L. Haffajee, 
Commentary, Murder Liability for Prescribing Opioids: A Way Forward?, 91 MAYO CLINIC 
PROC. 1331, 1331 (2016) (discussing a novel theory of criminal liability in the opioid context, 
where a physician is charged with murder for opioid overdose deaths that resulted from 
reckless prescribing practices); Katie Zezima & Sari Horwitz, Federal, State Authorities Step 
Up Fentanyl Prosecutions as Drug Drives Spike in Overdoses, WASH. POST (June 7, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/federal-state-authorities-step-up-fentanyl-
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organizations and charitable foundations are fundraising and publishing reports 
to mitigate opioid harms.8 Private sector corporations are donating profits to 
these efforts and seeking to innovate other potential products that treat pain non-
addictively or effectively manage addiction.9  
Garnering substantial attention is the spate of lawsuits brought against the 
companies responsible for supplying the prescription opioid market. The 
litigation examines the connection between the products manufactured, 
distributed, and marketed by major pharmaceutical brands (and approved for 
safety by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)) and the millions of persons 
addicted to opioids.10 The scope and frequency of the lawsuits, as well as their 
public health emphasis, prompt comparisons to the massive tobacco litigation 
of the 1990s.11 That litigation ultimately brought the four largest cigarette 
manufacturers to the table to negotiate a “Master Settlement Agreement” (MSA) 
worth hundreds of billions.12 Whether the opioid litigation will resolve similarly 
remains to be seen. 
Indeterminacy notwithstanding, the potential significance of a global opioid 
settlement agreement cannot be understated. On the one hand, an MSA could 
bring substantial money—much more than the federal government has yet 
invested even taking into account its latest Substance Use-Disorder Prevention 




 8 See, e.g., The Opioid Epidemic, ARNOLD VENTURES, https://www.arnold 
ventures.org/work/the-opioid-epidemic/ [https://perma.cc/FH76-6BEB]; Substance 
Use Disorders & Recovery: Our Approach, CLINTON FOUND., https://www.clinton 
foundation.org/our-work/clinton-health-matters-initiative/programs/substance-use-
disorders-recovery/our-approach [https://perma.cc/9VAQ-WA5S].  
 9 See, e.g., Aetna Foundation to Support States in Fight Against the Opioid Epidemic, 
AETNA FOUND. (Feb. 13, 2018), https://news.aetnafoundation.org/press-release/health-
care-equity/aetna-foundation-support-states-fight-against-opioid-epidemic [https:// 
perma.cc/875R-PWT4]; Cardinal Health Foundation Awards over $3 Million to More than 
70 Nonprofit Organizations to Fight the Opioid Epidemic Across Appalachia, CARDINAL 
HEALTH (June 19, 2018), http://cardinalhealth.mediaroom.com/GenRx_grants 
[https://perma.cc/J4ZR-2DU2]; McKesson Announces New Initiatives, Launches 
Foundation to Help Fight Nation’s Opioid Epidemic, MCKESSON (Mar. 29, 2018), 
https://www.mckesson.com/about-mckesson/newsroom/press-releases/2018/new-
initiatives-fight-opioid-epidemic/ [https://perma.cc/JHK7-HLCS]. 
 10 See Haffajee & Mello, supra note 4, at 2301 (describing how lawsuits allege opioid 
products “were defectively designed,” and manufacturers “failed to adequately warn about 
addiction risks” or “withheld information about their products’ dangers”).  
 11 See, e.g., Derek Carr et al., Reducing Harm through Litigation Against Opioid 
Manufacturers? Lessons from the Tobacco Wars, 133 PUB. HEALTH REP. 207, 207 (2018); 
Nicolas Terry & Aila Hoss, Opioid Litigation Proceeds: Cautionary Tales from the Tobacco 
Settlement, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (May 23, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/ 
10.1377/hblog20180517.992650/full/  [https://perma.cc/XEU3-MF7F]. 
 12 Carr et al., supra note 11, at 207–08.  
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(SUPPORT) Act—and change behavior to ameliorate opioid harms.13 On the 
other hand, such an agreement could actually fail to promote public health goals 
if it mimics the use of funds from the tobacco MSA.14  
But, history does not have to repeat itself. This Article responds to skeptics 
of a potential global opioid settlement agreement by proposing terms that would 
further public health goals. While a blockbuster agreement is uncertain, it 
appears increasingly likely that an MSA of some sort will be reached in the 
multi-district litigation where the emphasis has been on improving health and 
other life outcomes in the midst of the crisis. This Article proceeds by providing 
an overview of the opioid litigation in Part II. Part III discusses lessons that can 
be drawn from past settlements—both the tobacco MSA and prior smaller 
opioid settlements. Part IV conceptualizes what form an MSA might take, 
outlining how damages and behavior change components could be structured to 
maximize public health benefits. Part V offers some concluding thoughts.  
II. THE OPIOID LITIGATION, IN BRIEF 
At the federal, state, and local levels, plaintiffs are pursuing litigation to 
hold pharmaceutical industry interests accountable for the costs of the opioid 
epidemic.15 The diverse array of claimants includes private classes of 
consumers; hospitals and healthcare organizations; the federal government; 
state attorneys general; and local and tribal governments.16 The defendants are 
 
 13 See Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and 
Treatment (SUPPORT) for Patients and Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 115-271, 132 Stat. 
3894 (2018) [hereinafter SUPPORT Act]; German Lopez, Trump Just Signed a Bipartisan 
Bill to Confront the Opioid Epidemic, VOX (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-
and-politics/2018/9/28/17913938/trump-opioid-epidemic-congress-support-act-bill-
law [https://perma.cc/4LVP-H5L7] (noting that “the law [does] not provide a significant 
increase in spending for the opioid crisis at all,” but “authorizes some relatively small grant 
programs”); Haffajee & Mello, supra note 4, at 2305 (listing productive ways the settlement 
terms could be structured, such that an agreement “hold[s] real hope for arresting the opioid 
epidemic”). 
 14 See Carr et al., supra note 11, at 209–10 (contending that the tobacco MSA funds 
were misused, and arguing that “[f]ew reasons exist to believe a similarly styled opioid MSA 
would produce better results” than the tobacco MSA did); Terry & Hoss, supra note 11 
(cautioning that “[s]takeholders should not wait for the worst aspects of the tobacco 
settlement to be replayed,” and generally critical that “plaintiffs and their lawyers seem keen 
to capture funds now”).  
 15 See generally Richard C. Ausness, The Role of Litigation in the Fight Against 
Prescription Drug Abuse, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1117 (2014); Abbe R. Gluck et al., Civil 
Litigation and the Opioid Epidemic: The Role of Courts in a National Health Crisis, 46 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 351 (2018); Haffajee & Mello, supra note 4.  
 16 See Haffajee & Mello, supra note 4, at 2302–04; West Virginia Hospitals Sue Opioid 
Companies; Want Damages, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.modern 
healthcare.com/providers/west-virginia-hospitals-sue-opioid-companies-want-
damages [https://perma.cc/3BMG-LET3]. 
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largely pharmaceutical manufacturers, distributors, and retailers.17 Depending 
on the defendant, the suits differ in theories of liability asserted. Among other 
claims, manufacturers are accused of misrepresenting the addictive nature of 
opioid products in marketing campaigns and detailing efforts, and failing to 
adequately warn consumers about the potential for addiction;18 distributors are 
alleged to have violated federal duties to monitor and report suspicious 
prescription ordering activity;19 retailers are sued for negligently filling 
suspicious prescription orders despite “red flags.”20 The actions also vary in the 
relief sought. Beyond just money damages, the government plaintiffs typically 
seek to enjoin the defendants’ future conduct: forbidding the companies from 
continuing their misrepresentations of the risks posed by opioid treatment of 
chronic pain or failing to report suspicious prescriptions and requiring 
restitution payments for any profits gained from these illegal practices.21 
 
 17 See Haffajee & Mello, supra note 4, at 2301–04. Some recent cases also name 
healthcare industry groups as defendants, as well as pharmacy benefit management 
companies. See, e.g., Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 36, Cty. of Webb v. Purdue 
Pharma, L.P. et al., 1:18-op-45175-DAP (N.D. Ohio Sept. 17, 2018); Complaint at 62–70, 
Employer-Teamsters Local Nos. 175 & 505 Health & Welfare Fund et al. v. Purdue Pharma 
L.P. et al., 1:18-OP-45446 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 17, 2018); Complaint at 2–5, City of Charleston 
v. Joint Comm’n on Accreditation of Health Care Orgs., 2:17-cv-04267 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 
2, 2017);.  
 18 Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, 
Public Health Tragedy, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 221, 223 (2009). For a history of marketing 
and public representations by manufacturers and their connection to the addiction epidemic, 
see generally id.; MINORITY STAFF OF S. HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 
COMM., 115TH CONG., INSYS THERAPEUTICS AND THE SYSTEMIC MANIPULATION OF PRIOR 
AUTHORIZATION (Comm. Print 2017); and Charles Ornstein & Ryann Grochowski Jones, 
Opioid Makers, Blamed for Overdose Epidemic, Cut Back on Marketing Payments to 
Doctors, PROPUBLICA (June 28, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/opioid-
makers-blamed-for-overdose-epidemic-cut-back-on-marketing-payments-to-doctors 
%C2%A0 [https://perma.cc/2HH3-52PM]. 
 19 See Nora Freeman Engstrom et al., Suing the Opioid Companies, STAN. L. SCH. 
BLOGS: LEGAL AGGREGATE (Aug. 30, 2018), https://law.stanford.edu/2018/08/30/q-and-
a-with-mello-and-engstrom/ [https://perma.cc/3UP6-MC8S] (describing the claims 
against distributors as alleging a failure “to monitor, detect, investigate, and report suspicious 
orders of prescription drugs, even though reasonably prudent suppliers would have done so 
and the federal Controlled Substances Act requires suppliers to maintain effective controls 
against diversion of controlled substances to illicit markets”). 
 20 Kelly K. Dineen & James M. DuBois, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Can 
Physicians Prescribe Opioids to Treat Pain Adequately While Avoiding Legal Sanction?, 42 
AM. J.L. MED. 7, 31 (2016) (describing how doctors may be liable for violating the 
Controlled Substances Act when “ignor[ing] many warning signs and red flags and 
consciously eschew[ing] performing the most rudimentary screening that would have 
revealed many . . . patients’ ruses”) (quoting United States v. Katz, 445 F.3d 1023, 1031 (8th 
Cir. 2006)). 
 21 See, e.g., Complaint at 100–01, State ex rel. DeWine v. Purdue Pharma, No. 
2017CL261 (Ross Cty. Ct. C.P. May 31, 2017); Complaint at 51–52, State v. Purdue Pharma, 
No. 512018CA001438CAAXWS (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 15, 2018); Complaint at 85, State v. 
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Defendants have responded in turn by challenging the chain of causation 
between their own conduct and the intervening actions of healthcare providers 
and patients.22 Further, manufacturers often raise preemption defenses, arguing 
that the FDA’s approval of the drugs for safety preempts state-based claims.23 
During the early 2000s, the first wave of opioid litigation characterized by 
personal injury suits waged against Purdue Pharma was largely subsumed by 
these defenses.24 More generally, the imbalance of resources between the 
individual plaintiffs and the well-resourced pharmaceutical industry defendants 
often proved fatal.25 The ongoing current wave, however, appears more 
viable.26 Those cases, currently being litigated, can be grouped into two 
categories: class action suits and suits in which a government is plaintiff.27 The 
class action vehicle helps level the resources brought to bear by parties and 
allows plaintiffs to overcome some of the procedural obstacles faced by the first 
wave of individual suits. For example, demonstrating the causal connection 
between a manufacturer’s business practices and an alleged harm is generally 
easier for a group of hundreds of similarly situated people than at the individual 
level.28 With a state or local government as the plaintiff, the injury is redefined 
 
Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 3AN-17-09966CI (D. Alaska Oct. 30, 2017). See generally 
Haffajee & Mello, supra note 4. 
 22 Gluck et al., supra note 15, at 357 (citing Memorandum in Support of Defendant 
McKesson Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint at 1, 15, Kanawha Cty. 
Comm’n v. Rite Aid of Maryland, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-01666 (S.D. W. Va. 2017); 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant McKesson Corp.’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint at 
13–16, Cabell Cty. Comm’n v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., No. 3:17-cv-01665 (S.D. 
W.Va. Apr. 11, 2017)). 
 23 Gluck et al., supra note 15, at 357 (citing Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Defendant Purdue’s Demurrer at 17, State v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 30-2014-00725287-
CU-BT-CXC (Sup. Ct. Ca. 2015); Memorandum in Support of the Purdue Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for Failure to State a Claim at 1, Ohio ex rel. 
DeWine v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CV-17 CI 000261 (Ross Cty. Ct. C.P. Sept. 8, 2017)). 
 24 See Haffajee & Mello, supra note 4, at 2304. For representative cases from this period 
of litigation, see Andrew Joseph, A Veteran New York Litigator Is Taking on Opioid Makers. 
They Have a History, STAT (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/10/10/  
opioid-lawsuits-paul-hanly/ [https://perma.cc/G6QX-522N] (describing suits filed on 
behalf of individual plaintiffs beginning in 2003, but noting that prior to a landmark 2007 
settlement, “case after case against the [manufacturer of OxyContin] failed” in part because 
“[e]arlier lawsuits were brought by firms with fewer resources representing just a few 
patients” and defensive “hurdles” like FDA-approval and intervening causes “tripped up 
lawsuits”).  
 25 See Haffajee & Mello, supra note 4, at 2304; Ausness, supra note 15, at 1120.  
 26 See Haffajee & Mello, supra note 4, at 2301, 2304 (describing how the “formidable 
barriers” faced by the first wave of litigation “persist today,” but noting that “[t]he tide may 
turn for such lawsuits” as class action and government cases are bolstered by epidemiological 
data from the crisis’ growth).  
 27 See id. at 2304. 
 28 Id. 
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as one to public coffers and environment, avoiding some of the causation 
challenges and affirmative defenses that stymied individual claims.29 
A significant milestone in the wave of government suits that could pave the 
way towards a tobacco litigation-like MSA was the consolidation of over 150 
cases brought by state and local governments in federal court under multidistrict 
litigation (MDL) in the northern district of Ohio in December 2017.30 While it 
is difficult to generalize about the many different suits with unique complaints, 
numbering over 2000 as of September 2019,31 they consistently seek 
compensation for the damage arising from improper marketing and distribution 
of prescription opioid medications into cities, states, and towns across the 
nation.32 Plaintiffs allege the defendants are responsible for opiate diversion into 
their communities;33 violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
(RICO) statutes, consumer protection laws, and state analogues to the 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA).34 The lawsuits also regularly assert common 
 
 29 Id. (“Because the government itself is claiming injury and seeking 
restitution . . . these suits avoid defenses that blame opioid consumers or prescribers [and 
they] garner substantial publicity.”). 
 30 Transfer Order at 1–4, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-
DAP (N.D. Ohio Dec. 12, 2017). N.D. Ohio was chosen from several options due to its 
“strong factual connection to this litigation” after it “experienced a significant rise in the 
number of opioid-related overdoses in the past several years and expended significant sums 
in dealing with the effects of the opioid epidemic.” Id.  
 31 Andrew Joseph, Purdue Pharma Filed for Bankruptcy. What Does It Mean for 
Lawsuits Against the Opioid Manufacturer?, STAT (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.stat 
news.com/2019/09/16/if-purdue-pharma-declares-bankruptcy-what-would-it-mean-
for-lawsuits-against-the-opioid-manufacturer [https://perma.cc/TZ4E-5JXT]. Indeed, 
one facet of this difficulty is the many different methods by which the complainants calculate 
damages. For example, New Jersey’s complaint against Purdue Pharma estimates $290 
million has been spent from state coffers on opioids (including Medicaid, workers’ 
compensation, and employee and retiree health programs). Terry & Hoss, supra note 11. By 
contrast, the City of Tacoma estimated damages by quantifying how “the opioid crisis has 
increased the city’s spending across health care, social services, emergency services, and 
public safety,” and has implemented a new tax increase to raise $10 million annually to fund 
opioid spending. Id.  
 32 Transfer Order, supra note 30, at 1.  
 33 “[D]iversion” refers to “the unlawful channeling of regulated pharmaceuticals from 
legal sources to the illicit marketplace.” James A. Inciardi et al., Mechanisms of Prescription 
Drug Diversion Among Drug-Involved Club- and Street-Based Populations, 8 PAIN MED. 
171, 171 (2007). Diversion is a major factor contributing to the opioid epidemic and can be 
both exacerbated or minimized by the conduct of pharmaceutical companies. See Kathryn L. 
Hahn, Strategies to Prevent Opioid Misuse, Abuse, and Diversion that May Also Reduce the 
Associated Costs, 4 AM. HEALTH & DRUG BENEFITS 107, 111 (2011); Nora D. Volkow & 
Thomas A. McLellan, Commentary, Curtailing Diversion and Abuse of Opioid Analgesics 
Without Jeopardizing Pain Treatment, 305 JAMA 1346, 1346 (2011).  
 34 See supra notes 21, 23 and accompanying text; Haffajee & Mello, supra note 4, at 
2302–03; Gluck et al., supra note 15, at 353, 355. 
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law claims of public nuisance, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, 
and unjust enrichment.35 
The federal judge overseeing the MDL, Judge Dan Aaron Polster, has 
garnered attention for an unorthodox approach: implementing an aggressive trial 
schedule and explicitly calling for a major settlement agreement.36 While his 
tactics may be overly ambitious given the litigation’s complexities and even 
overreaching for a court of law, they do weigh in favor of a potentially 
significant MDL settlement.37 But questions remain about which parties that 
settlement might involve, and whether it will be on the same historic scale as 
the tobacco MSA.38 A global settlement that resolves the pending liability 
comprehensively could appeal to both sides: the pharmaceutical industry could 
avoid extensive, costly, and image-battering suits, while government plaintiffs 
could gain sorely needed resources, perhaps swiftly.39 The private plaintiffs’ 
firms litigating on behalf of state attorneys general and local governments 
mostly on a contingency basis, however, may have perverse incentives to 
maximize their profits over costs, rather than achieve the most just outcome for 
their clients.40  
MDL settlement prospects are limited by challenges unique to the posture 
of the litigation. Hundreds of opioid cases are not subsumed in the MDL, and 
rather reside—often by design to gain local tactical advantages—in state or 
tribal courts.41 This complicates the endgame of an MSA, given that the 
 
 35 See supra notes 21, 23 and accompanying text; Haffajee & Mello, supra note 4, at 
2302. 
 36 See generally Jan Hoffman, Can This Judge Solve the Opioid Crisis?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/health/opioid-crisis-judge-law 
suits.html [https://perma.cc/CYF8-ZJFF]; Jeff Overley & Emily Field, Opioid MDL 
Judge Sets Litigation Plan, Bashes DEA, LAW360 (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.law 
360.com/articles/1009123/opioid-mdl-judge-sets-litigation-plan-bashes-dea [on file 
with Ohio State Law Journal]. 
 37 Hoffman, supra note 36 (“‘These are bold things for a judge to say and it’s exciting 
and intriguing to follow,’ said Abbe R. Gluck, a professor at Yale Law School . . . . B̒ut to 
say that his goals are ambitious would be an enormous understatement.’”). 
 38 See Gluck et al., supra note 15, at 360.  
 39 Id. (“Defendants have an interest in a global settlement that resolves all their liability 
in one shot . . . [and] state Attorneys General[] will be attracted to early settlement and quick 
gains. . . .”).  
 40 See Andrew Harris et al., Justice for Opioid Communities Means Massive Payday 
for Their Lawyers, BLOOMBERG (July 25, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/ 
2018-opioid-lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/5H5A-MCN2]. Plaintiffs’ attorneys on such 
cases work on a “contingency fee” basis, meaning they work the case for no-money-down 
in exchange for a stake in the award if successful. See id. The fees at stake in the opioids 
cases typically range between 25–33% of total recovery. Id. On the upper end of projections 
for the hypothetical value of the opioids litigation, this could mean a “$12.5 billion payday” 
for the plaintiffs’ firms. Id. 
 41 See Gluck et al., supra note 15, at 359 (describing how West Virginia and the 
Cherokee Nation sought “to avoid being pulled into the MDL” by emphasizing that state law 
predominates over their cases); Terry & Hoss, supra note 11 (speculating that “some cities 
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defendants’ primary incentive to settle is to avoid drawn-out courtroom battles 
and costs by resolving all litigation simultaneously.42 It may well be that the 
factors that drove the tobacco companies to the settlement table in the 1990s do 
not pose a sufficient degree of pressure on the opioid defendants.43 Instead, 
opioid defendants might prefer to holdout for a bargain settlement or even opt 
for trial, especially since certain key plaintiff legal theories are novel and 
untested.44 Despite these uncertainties, recent developments provide hope for 
an historic resolution. 
III. LESSONS FROM PAST ADDICTIVE PRODUCT SETTLEMENTS 
Should a comprehensive resolution to the opioid litigation materialize, an 
important objective at the forefront of Judge Polster’s mind concerns the optimal 
forms of relief to maximize public health benefits.45 Scholarly theories conflict 
regarding the value of litigation as a tool for regulation46 and regarding the 
 
are staying out of the federal MDL” because they are “betting on a higher payday before 
their state courts,” given that the MDL will rack up “administrative costs and attorneys’ fees” 
and damages will be “split among hundreds of plaintiffs”); see also Andrew Joseph, Why 
Houston and Other Cities Want Nothing to Do with the Massive National Opioid Lawsuit, 
STAT (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/03/27/houston-national-opioid 
-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/AB5T-XZQU].  
 42 Hoffman, supra note 36 (“The defendants will most likely insist on a settlement that 
would resolve most, if not all, the state lawsuits as well as the federal ones.”). 
 43 Terry & Hoss, supra note 11 (noting that the following differences between the 
tobacco and opioid litigations “may yet encourage the defendants to litigate instead of settle 
or depress the settlement amount”: the opioid manufacturers are fewer and of lesser value 
than “Big Tobacco” was; the “heterogeneous nature” of losses by opioids differ from the 
“relatively simple” tobacco cases; the MSA settlement talks were simplified because tobacco 
had “no health benefit,” whereas any opioid settlement would be complicated by opioids’ 
continued beneficial role in healthcare). 
 44 See Jef Feeley, Opioid Deal in West Virginia May Spur More Agreements, 
BLOOMBERG (May 2, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-02/ 
mckesson-settles-west-virginia-opioid-sales-claims-for-37-mln [https://perma.cc/XP 
88-M9NX]. For example, though many government plaintiffs assert claims against the 
major pharmaceutical distributors for violations of duties under the CSA, it remains an open 
question whether violations of the CSA can give rise to an independently enforceable cause 
of action. See Gluck et al., supra note 15, at 356. Similarly, claims against healthcare industry 
groups, like the Joint Commission, that argue collusion with pharmaceutical companies or 
against pharmaceutical benefit managers, or that argue negligent authorization of coverage 
for unnecessary prescriptions, are theories of first impression. Id. at 356–57. It also remains 
to be seen how far manufacturer’s preemption defense, contending that FDA approval of 
opioid products preempts state-based tort liability, may extend. See generally Marcia 
Boumil, FDA Approval of Drugs and Devices: Preemption of State Laws for “Parallel” Tort 
Claims, 18 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 1 (2015). 
 45 See Hoffman, supra note 36. 
 46 W.E. Parmet & R.A. Daynard, The New Public Health Litigation, 21 ANN. REV. PUB. 
HEALTH 437, 441, 446 (2000) (surveying the rise of affirmative litigation in public health 
campaigns to regulate firearms, lead paint, and tobacco, noting that some leading scholars 
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effectiveness (and fairness) of regulatory settlement agreements.47 Two decades 
have passed since the 1998 Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, allowing for 
retrospective assessment of the agreement’s successes and failures. This Part 
considers those findings, as well as the terms of opioid settlements previously 
reached, to generate insights for a potential opioid MSA.  
A. The Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement 
After years of fruitless litigation, the four major tobacco manufacturers were 
finally forced to compromise when a coalition of forty-six state attorneys 
general and six other U.S. jurisdictions, rather than classes of private plaintiffs, 
rallied around a novel liability theory to recover government Medicaid and other 
costs incurred from spending on tobacco-related morbidity and mortality.48 To 
help the states’ case, damning whistleblower evidence, in the form of the 
Tobacco Papers, emerged to establish that tobacco companies knew of their 
products’ addictive properties and nevertheless conspired to suppress this 
 
believe “courts cannot create significant social change except in limited circumstances,” 
while contending that “public health litigation . . . may at times play a constructive, if not 
decisive, role in the democratic struggle to protect the public’s health”); see also Donald G. 
Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature: State Attorneys General and Parens Patriae 
Product Litigation, 49 B.C. L. REV. 913, 915 (2008) (arguing that product litigation aimed at 
regulating controversial markets subverts democratic processes); Peter D. Jacobson & 
Kenneth E. Warner, Litigation and Public Health Policy Making: The Case of Tobacco 
Control, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 769, 769 (1999) (concluding that “in general, public 
health goals are more directly achievable through the political process than through 
litigation,” but that some circumstances are well-served by litigation campaigns that 
“stimulate[] a national debate” and “move the policy agenda”). 
 47 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in 
Multidistrict Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1445, 1449 (2017) 
(arguing that large MDL settlement dynamics mean that “defendants can take advantage of 
lead attorneys’ control over settlement negotiations to strike deals that benefit the leaders 
and the defendant, but not the claimants”); Andrew J. Haile & Matthew W. Krueger-Andes, 
Landmark Settlements and Unintended Consequences, 44 U. TOL. L. REV. 145, 175 (2012) 
(concluding that global settlements allow “defendants in regulatory litigation [to] effectively 
set public policy and even draft the language of legislation that state legislatures are then, for 
all practical purposes, required to enact”); Ryan D. Dreveskracht, Forfeiting Federalism: 
The Faustian Pact with Big Tobacco, 18 RICH. J. L. & PUB. INT. 291, 293, 315 (2015) 
(analyzing the tobacco MSA to conclude that state attorneys general reliance on litigation 
empowered “Big Tobacco” and displaced federalism’s intended balance of powers). 
 48 Arthur B. LaFrance, Tobacco Litigation: Smoke, Mirrors and Public Policy, 26 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 187, 187–93 (2000) (cataloging that from 1954 to 1994, when 813 private, state 
tort claims were filed against the tobacco industry, “[o]nly twice did courts find in favor of 
the plaintiffs,” in part because of “a decades-long pattern of deliberate concealment, 
misrepresentation and deception by the tobacco companies.” But, when AGs started bringing 
cases based on state Medicaid costs, they “broke the logjam of documentary deceit and 
concealment” and brought about “a sea change” in the litigation).  
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information and mislead consumers.49 Settlement talks were initiated in 1996 
and finalized in 1998 among the governments that were ultimately party to the 
litigation.50 In exchange for tortious immunity, the agreement required industry 
to pay approximately $246 billion in penalties to state and local governments 
over a twenty-five year period,51 plus an additional $9 billion per year in 
perpetuity thereafter, though it was virtually silent as to how those funds should 
be spent.52 It also imposed injunctive requirements on tobacco marketing, 
particularly to young consumers.53 The complex terms of the agreement have 
given rise to an entire body of case law litigating the scope of the settlement’s 
requirements for each state that ratified it.54  
The tobacco MSA marked a turning point in the decades-long campaign to 
regulate tobacco more stringently.55 The settlement agreement stands as the 
largest ever settlement implemented in the U.S.56 and has been characterized by 
anti-smoking advocates as “the most significant increase in spending on tobacco 
prevention and cessation in history.”57 The MSA’s advertising enjoinders 
included mandatory funding for a massive “countermarketing” campaign led by 
the American Legacy Foundation.58 To pay for the costs of the MSA, tobacco 
 
 49 Peter Pringle, The Chronicles of Tobacco: An Account of the Forces that Brought the 
Tobacco Industry to the Negotiating Table, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 387, 387–88 (1999).  
 50 Steven A. Schroeder, Tobacco Control in the Wake of the 1998 Master Settlement 
Agreement, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 293, 294 (2004). 
 51 Terry & Hoss, supra note 11. See generally National Association of Attorneys 
General, Master Settlement Agreement (1998), http://www.naag.org/assets/redesign/ 
files/msa-tobacco/MSA.pdf [https://perma.cc/23ZL-BSDV] [hereinafter Master 
Settlement Agreement] (presenting the most recent reprint of the MSA in full); TOBACCO 
CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, PUB. HEALTH L. CTR., THE MASTER SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT: AN OVERVIEW (2015), http://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/resources/tclc-fs-msa-overview-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6M4-
LLWF] [hereinafter MSA OVERVIEW] (summarizing the terms and effects of the MSA). 
 52 See MSA OVERVIEW, supra note 51, at 3. See generally Master Settlement 
Agreement, supra note 51. 
 53 For example, the MSA famously marked the death of the “Joe Camel” advertising 
campaign. See Schroeder, supra note 50, at 294. 
 54 See generally Robin Miller, Validity, Construction, Application, and Effect of Master 
Settlement Agreement (MSA) Between Tobacco Companies and Various States, and State 
Statutes Implementing Agreement; Use and Distribution of MSA Proceeds, 25 A.L.R.6th 435 
(2007). 
 55 Robert S. Wood, Tobacco’s Tipping Point: The Master Settlement Agreement as a 
Focusing Event, 34 POL’Y STUD. J. 419, 425, 431 (2006) (concluding that the MSA was a 
“tipping event” that “represents genuine policy change” and that will “have lasting 
institutional impacts”). 
 56 Cheryl Healton, The Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement—Strategic Lessons for 
Addressing Public Health Problems, 379 NEW ENG. J. MED. 997, 997 (2018).  
 57 Schroeder, supra note 50, at 295; see also MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, SMOKE IN THEIR 
EYES 221 (2001) (“[T]he single most fundamental change in the history of tobacco control 
in the history of the world.”) (quoting Matt Myers of the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids). 
 58 Schroeder, supra note 50, at 295 (identifying the prominent “truth” campaign as 
funded by the MSA).  
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companies raised prices on cigarettes significantly, initiating a corresponding 
decrease in demand that achieved, to a limited degree and albeit indirectly, the 
ultimate goal of smoking prevention and cessation.59 
But even at the time of the settlement’s implementation, there were critics 
skeptical of the litigation’s capacity to bring about authentic policy change.60 In 
the years since, policy advocates and researchers alike have widely criticized 
the MSA as failing to sufficiently reduce harms from tobacco, even though it 
did effectively impose a large monetary penalty against the industry.61 Many 
argue that MSA funds were insufficiently tethered to the goal of reducing 
smoking rates and were instead diverted into state coffers for unrelated, 
inefficient purposes like servicing debt and closing budget shortfalls.62 Further, 
because the states were granted MSA payments from tobacco companies 
prospectively in perpetuity, without spending stipulations, many states 
securitized their future payments into bonds for more immediate cash on hand.63 
For public health activists who hoped the MSA might mark the end of “Big 
 
 59 Id. But see Gregory W. Traylor, Note, Big Tobacco, Medicaid-Covered Smokers, and 
the Substance of the Master Settlement Agreement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1081, 1101–14 (2010) 
(arguing that the cigarette price increases caused by the MSA resulted in Medicaid-covered 
smokers essentially “footing the bill” of the tobacco manufacturers’ MSA payments).  
 60 LaFrance, supra note 48, at 189 (describing why the American Cancer Society filed 
a brief opposing the settlement agreement, and arguing that the costs of the settlement for 
“Big Tobacco” would be “passed on to an addicted consumer base,” such that industry would 
“self-insure against the injuries it inflicts and continue its course of destructive conduct” 
without “genuine improvement in the nation’s health”).  
 61 See, e.g., Jayani Jayawardhana et al., Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) Spending 
and Tobacco Control Efforts, PLOS ONE 1, 15, 18 (2014) (using empirical methods to find 
“that MSA payments were negatively associated with overall measure of strength of tobacco 
control in states” because “the longer range objective of reducing tobacco use is often 
ignored when revenue allocation decisions are made by state legislatures”); Jim Estes, 
Opinion, How the Big Tobacco Deal Went Bad, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/07/opinion/how-the-big-tobacco-deal-went-bad 
.html [https://perma.cc/6YMT-UBMB] (criticizing that states used MSA funds for 
projects such as construction of shipping docks, a public golf course sprinkler system, and a 
county jail, while projected to spend only 1.9% of MSA revenues on tobacco prevention 
programs in 2014). 
 62 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-534T, STATES’ ALLOCATIONS OF 
PAYMENTS FROM TOBACCO COMPANIES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2005 6 (2007) 
(finding that, from 2000 to 2005, only 3.5% of total MSA revenues were spent on tobacco 
control programs, while 22.9% went towards state budget gaps, 7.1% towards “general 
purposes,” and 6% towards “infrastructure”); Haile & Krueger-Andes, supra note 47, at 146 
(“[I]n 2011 the states collectively used less than 2% of their annual MSA payments for 
smoking control and prevention programs.”); Walter J. Jones & Gerard A. Silvestri, 
Commentary, The Master Settlement Agreement and Its Impact on Tobacco Use 10 Years 
Later: Lessons for Physicians About Health Policy Making, 137 CHEST 692, 697 (2010) (“It 
is clear that the MSA has not resulted in a[n] . . . intensification of state tobacco control 
efforts, because . . . MSA resources have been significantly diverted from tobacco control 
and treatment into other state policy activities.”).  
 63 See Schroeder, supra note 50, at 295. 
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Tobacco” forever, this financial symbiosis instead “created perverse incentives 
for the states to keep the tobacco industry financially healthy.”64 While there are 
some who view the benefits of the tobacco MSA as outweighing the costs,65 
several cautionary takeaways emerge that can be applied to a global opioid 
settlement. 
B. Past Opioid Settlements 
The specter of the tobacco MSA looms over the contemporary opioid 
litigation. The similar addictive properties of the substances and cumulative 
volume of cases brought by most state attorneys general, as well as local 
governments naturally raise comparisons between the opioid and tobacco 
litigation. Some fear that a global opioid settlement would fall prey to certain 
features embodied in the tobacco MSA that benefitted industry, failed to 
improve the public’s health, or both.66 Pointing to a handful of settlements from 
the first wave of opioid litigation, critics argue that there is already evidence that 
opioid settlements are ineffective as a direct public health response to opioid 
addiction (see Tables 1–3).67 For example, in 2007, a multistate coalition of 27 
state attorneys general reached a $19.5 million settlement agreement with 
Purdue.68 The settlement is largely viewed as a failure, given its relatively paltry 
damages award and that the opioid epidemic only continued to accelerate 
afterwards.69 Moreover, pharmaceutical companies apparently continued the 
 
 64 Id. at 295 (quoting anti-smoking advocate Matt Myers as viewing the tobacco 
industry as the “winner” of the litigation because of the perverse incentives in the states’ 
relationship with the manufacturers).  
 65 See, e.g., Michael Givel & Stanton A. Glantz, The “Global Settlement” with the 
Tobacco Industry: 6 Years Later, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 218, 224 (2004) (“Far from 
representing ‘missed opportunities,’ the global settlement proposal, the subsequent debates 
leading to its rejection, the MSA, the ongoing litigation in the area, and the policies that have 
been developed since 1997 have advanced tobacco control substantially.”). 
 66 See Terry & Hoss, supra note 11 (“How the settlement funds from the 1990s tobacco 
litigation have been distributed provides a cautionary precedent [for the opioid litigation].”); 
Carr et al., supra note 11, at 207 (“[A] similar agreement [to the tobacco MSA] in the [opioid] 
context would be unlikely to substantially reduce opioid-related morbidity and mortality 
absent contemporaneous comprehensive regulatory reform.”). 
 67 See, e.g., Carr et al., supra note 11, at 208 (highlighting how “[d]espite these legal 
consequences” from the first wave of litigation, “some [opioid] manufacturers allegedly 
continued to use misleading and illegal practices” that gave rise to the second wave); Terry 
& Hoss, supra note 11 (criticizing West Virginia’s use of settlement funds from a 2004 
agreement reached with Purdue Pharma).  
 68 See Consent Judgment at 14, State v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 07-2-00917-2 (Wash. 
Ct. Sup. May 9, 2007); AG Files Judgment with Purdue Pharma Over Marketing of 
OxyContin, OR. DEP’T JUST. (May 8, 2007), https://www.doj.state.or.us/media-
home/news-media-releases/ag-files-judgment-purdue-pharma-marketing-oxycontin 
[https://perma.cc/E5FX-MH4T]. 
 69 Laura Strickler, Drugmakers May Face More Legal Action over Opioid Epidemic, 
CBS NEWS (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/oxycontin-opioid-drug-
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very practices that were litigated despite the settlement’s inclusion behavior 
change requirements, namely making misrepresentations about the 
addictiveness of opioid products.70 One attorney from the Oregon Attorney 
General’s office, the office that led the coalition, recently testified to Congress 
that the settlement “did not require Purdue to take sufficient remedial action” 
because the government attorneys “did not fully appreciate the severity of the 
opioid epidemic and the long-lasting effects of Purdue’s [OxyContin] 
promotion.”71 
A West Virginia case provides another example of missed opportunity. The 
state police received a $44 million portion of the criminal asset forfeiture 
payment made to the Department of Justice following its 2007 prosecution of 
Purdue Pharma executives.72 A portion of that payment went to the construction 
of a 12,000 foot police academy training facility, featuring a gymnasium and 
combat training room, and remodeling projects including replacement of stucco 
exteriors with brick.73 For skeptics of the public health value of settlement 
 
makers-legal-action/ [https://perma.cc/6HSV-HYSY] (“The company had to pay nearly 
$20 million but there has been, in the words of one assistant attorney general, ‘tremendous 
buyer’s remorse’ that the settlements did not extract more money, accountability or change 
in the prescribing culture.”). 
 70 Carr et al., supra note 11, at 208 (“Despite these legal consequences, some [opioid] 
manufacturers allegedly continued to use misleading and illegal practices. In 2015, Purdue 
settled lawsuits brought by New York and Kentucky alleging improper marketing of 
OxyContin—nearly the same allegations to which the company had pled guilty in federal 
court 8 years before.”).  
 71 Examining the Opioid Epidemic: Challenges and Opportunities, Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Fin., 114th Cong. 11 (2016) (“Had I so known, I would have advocated for a 
settlement which would have required more extensive remedial action by Purdue to correct 
the inappropriate prescribing patterns for opioids. . . .”). Id. at 42. 
 72 W. VA. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE, PLAN FOR A DRUG-FREE WEST VIRGINIA 6 (Jan. 2008), 
https://djcs.wv.gov/grant-programs/Specialized%20Programs/PPF/Documents/  
Purdue%20Pharma%20Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/DG5F-52DF] [hereinafter W. VA. 
GOVERNOR’S REPORT] (documenting WVSP’s portion of the asset forfeiture payment, noting 
that “[f]ederal asset forfeiture funds, considered to be proceeds of criminal activities, are 
often shared by the federal government with state and local law enforcement authorities that 
have contributed to the investigation and/or prosecution of federal crimes”).  
 73 Cathleen Moxley, West Virginia State Police Open New Training Center, WSAZ 
NEWSCHANNEL 3 (Apr. 24, 2012), https://www.wsaz.com/home/headlines/WV_ 
State_Police_Open_New_Training_Center_148764835.html [https://perma.cc/97M3-
9RNR]; Marianne Skolek, West Virginia Uses OxyContin Settlement Money to Build Gym, 
NAT’L PAIN REP. (Apr. 30, 2012), http://nationalpainreport.com/west-virginia-uses-
oxycontin-settlement-money-to-build-a-gym-8814021.html [https://perma.cc/F9RT-
VET6]. 
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agreements, this provides a straightforward illustration of squandered 
opportunity74 that hearkens back to a repetition of tobacco MSA mistakes.75  
Reviewing more recent settlements, however, paints a more mixed picture. 
Several cases from the ongoing current wave of opioid litigation have settled 
and seem to indicate an ambition among the stakeholders to avoid repeating past 
mistakes. For example, in a 2015 Purdue Pharma $24 million settlement with 
the State of Kentucky (paid out over eight years),76 funds are required by court 
order to go towards a public health fund for initiatives like addiction treatment.77 
Imposition of a “restricted fund” is one tactic for ensuring that settlement 
monies go towards meaningful and related purposes, and it improves upon the 
highly fungible state tobacco MSA payments. Moreover, embodying 
requirements in the court order, as opposed to the settlement agreement, renders 
the terms enforceable by the court itself—moving the settlement further from 
the law of contract and closer to something like a binding consent decree 
enforced by the judiciary.78  
 
 74 The reality may be more nuanced. For an example of the critique, see West Virginia 
activist and journalist Marianne Skolek, whose daughter died from an OxyContin overdose, 
asking “if the families of those addicted and dying from West Virginia’s prescription drug 
epidemic prefer dumbbells over drug treatment facilities.” Skolek, supra note 73. But the 
funds the West Virginia State Police used for their training facility were exclusively from 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) criminal asset forfeiture payment, not the settlement, from 
Purdue Pharma. See W. VA. GOVERNOR’S REPORT, supra note 72, at 6–7. Those payments 
of seized criminal proceeds go directly to the state police budget as opposed to general state 
coffers. Id. Moreover, they are subject to strict regulatory guidelines from the DOJ, and in 
this case DOJ specifically pre-approved the funds’ usage for “law enforcement training,” 
“law enforcement equipment and operations,” and “law enforcement facilities and 
equipment,” in addition to “drug education and awareness programs.” Id. While one might 
argue that all $44 million should have been spent on allaying West Virginia’s addiction 
crisis, $5 million on facilities and renovations is not necessarily a scandal, given that “U.S. 
Department of Justice asset forfeiture funds are typically used to support general law 
enforcement purposes.” Id. at 6.  
 75 Terry & Hoss, supra note 11 (invoking the West Virginia State Police remodeling 
project as raising “a most sobering precedent” from the tobacco MSA).  
 76 Settlement Agreement and General Release at 7–8, Kentucky ex rel. Conway v. 
Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 07-CI-01303 (Pike Cir. Ct. Dec. 22, 2015), https://ag.ky.gov/pdf 
_news/purduepharmaoxycontin.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VXT-Q9MG].  
 77 Agreed Judgment and Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice at 3–4, Kentucky ex 
rel. Conway v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 07-CI-01303 (Pike Cir. Ct. Dec. 22, 2015), 
https://ag.ky.gov/pdf_news/purduepharmaoxycontin.pdf  [https://perma.cc/3VXT-Q9 
MG] (“[A]ny funds shall be placed in a restricted fund . . . for the use of public health 
initiatives, educational or public safety campaigns, reimbursement or financing of health care 
services and infrastructure related to addiction prevention and treatment.”). 
 78 See Anthony DiSarro, Six Decrees of Separation: Settlement Agreements and 
Consent Orders in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 277–79 (2010) 
(explaining the sliding-scale distinctions between settlement agreement and consent decree, 
noting that “[t]he first distinction . . . is the mode of enforcement,” such that “an injunction 
in the consent decree makes non-compliance with the settlement terms contempt of court” 
while “failure to comply with a settlement agreement is simply a breach of contract”). 
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A more recent example of a state opioid litigation settlement in which funds 
have been earmarked for restricted purposes is that between the State of 
Oklahoma and Purdue Pharma.79 The settlement, valued at about $270 million, 
requires that $102.5 million go to Oklahoma State University’s center for 
addiction that specializes in research and education on addiction, and the 
Sackler family (not party to the suit) will donate an additional $75 million over 
five years to the center.80 Approximately $60 million will go towards attorneys’ 
fees, and $12.5 million will go directly to counties and municipalities to help 
pay for their costs attributable to the crisis.81 Finally, $20 million has been 
earmarked to pay for addiction treatment medicines.82 Although the overall 
amount of this settlement may have been lower than the costs of the crisis, due 
to bankruptcy threats posed by Purdue that would have significantly reduced 
any amounts recovered by Oklahoma,83 the specific uses of the bulk of the funds 
to ameliorate opioid harms is a step in the right direction. Moreover, Purdue 
agreed to stop promoting opioids in Oklahoma in perpetuity.84 The agreement 
may be an indication of industry defendants’ increasing openness to settle.85 
Since Purdue reached its agreement with Oklahoma, manufacturer defendant 
Teva also settled with the State in the days leading up to trial in exchange for an 
$85 million payment.86 In the same period, the West Virginia Attorney 
General’s Office announced its own $37 million settlement with distributor 
McKesson, with funds limited to “support of state initiatives to combat the 
opioid epidemic.”87 That settlement has received criticism from some in the 
 
 79 Consent Judgment as to the Purdue Defendants at 10, Oklahoma ex rel. Hunter v. 
Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CJ-2017-816 (Clev. Cty. D. Ct. Mar. 26, 2019), http://www.oag 
.ok.gov/Websites/oag/images/Consent%20Judgement.pdf  [https://perma.cc/HXC9-
P8LN]. 
 80 Id.; Jan Hoffman, Purdue Pharma and Sacklers Reach $270 Million Settlement in 
Opioid Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/26/ 
health/opioids-purdue-pharma-oklahoma.html [https://perma.cc/UL7R-GN3J]. 
 81 Consent Judgment as to the Purdue Defendants, supra note 79, at 10. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Hoffman, supra note 80. 
 84 Consent Judgment as to the Purdue Defendants, supra note 79, at 8–9.  
 85 See Francie Diep, What Oklahoma’s $270 Million Settlement with Purdue Pharma 
Means for the 1,000-Plus Opioid Cases Still Pending, PACIFIC STANDARD MAG. (Mar. 27, 
2019), https://psmag.com/news/what-oklahomas-settlement-with-purdue-pharma-
means-for-opioid-cases [https://perma.cc/U4KA-VRDT]. 
 86 Company Statement: Teva Reaches Agreement with State of Oklahoma to Resolve 
State’s Claim Against the Company, AP NEWS (May 26, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/ 
Business%20Wire/e3cbd00425694f2eb6ba2725620022db [https://perma.cc/GN4R-
BRSJ]. The settlement remains pending, and its terms unpublished, after the court insisted 
that “any provision of confidentiality needs to be stripped” and the agreement be published 
on the public docket. See Summary Order, Oklahoma ex rel. Hunter v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 
No. CJ-2017-816 (Clev. Cty. D. Ct. June 13, 2019) [on file with the author].  
 87 Press Release, McKesson Reaches Settlement with State of West Virginia on Opioid 
Order Monitoring and Reporting, McKesson (May 2, 2019), https://www.mckesson 
2019] SETTLING THE SCORE 717 
state—U.S. Senator for West Virginia Joe Manchin labelled it a “sweetheart 
deal” for McKesson—who view the payout as paltry when compared to West 
Virginia’s opioid-related costs or even to Oklahoma’s collection of hundreds of 
millions from Purdue.88 
In addition to distinct approaches to settlement payments, some third wave 
opioid settlements impose novel behavior change requirements on 
pharmaceutical defendants. In particular, a series of settlements obtained by the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) implement innovative enjoinders that go beyond 
generic prohibitions against the litigated conduct. The first settlement arose 
from a 2012 investigation of Cardinal Health by several U.S. Attorneys’ Offices 
and the DEA.89 Prosecutors utilized a legal theory that increasingly appears in 
new opioid suits and many of the MDL actions: imposing liability against a 
major pharmaceutical distributor for failing to comply with “suspicious order” 
reporting requirements under the CSA.90 To avoid litigation, Cardinal entered 
into an administrative agreement with the government to cooperate with the 
investigation.91 The investigation culminated in settlement payments of $34 
million and $10 million in 2016,92 and reinforced several enjoinders included in 
an earlier 2012 settlement.93 Those terms primarily included enhanced terms of 
 
.com/about-mckesson/newsroom/press-releases/2019/mckesson-reaches-settlement-
west-virginia-opioid-monitoring-reporting/ [https://perma.cc/A68Q-4CEE].  
 88 See Feeley, supra note 44. 
 89 See Cardinal Health, Inc. v. Holder, 846 F. Supp. 2d 203, 207–10 (D.D.C. 2012) 
(denying Cardinal’s motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin DEA’s suspension of 
Cardinal’s CSA license and detailing DEA’s investigation into diversion of opioid 
medications at Cardinal’s distribution facilities). 
 90 See Cardinal Health Agrees to $44 Million Settlement for Alleged Violations of 
Controlled Substances Act, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.justice 
.gov/usao-md/pr/cardinal-health-agrees-44-million-settlement-alleged-violations-
controlled-substances-act [https://perma.cc/2VER-ZLNT]. This theory of liability is 
particularly concerned with the issue of “diversion” of pharmaceuticals. See id.; Haffajee & 
Mello, supra note 34, at 2302–03.  
 91 ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 2, 4–5 (2012), 
https://www.thehealthlawfirm.com/uploads/Cardinal%20Health%20-%20Memo%20 
of%20Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/9A5W-H3EB] [hereinafter 2012 CARDINAL 
MOA].  
 92 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 5 (2016), https://www.bizjournals.com/tampa 
bay/news/2016/12/23/cardinal-health-agrees-to-44m-settlement-in.html [on file with 
Ohio State Law Journal]; Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces $10 Million Civil Penalty 
Recovery Against New York Pharmaceutical Distributor Kinray, Llc., U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 
23, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-
10-million-civil-penalty-recovery-against-new-york [https://perma.cc/8ZDB-RRK9] 
[hereinafter 2016 CARDINAL AGREEMENT].  
 93 See SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, supra note 92, at 7 (“This Agreement is not intended 
to and does not supersede the obligations contained in the May 2012 Administrative 
Memorandum of Agreement.”). 
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CSA compliance and internal corporate reforms that facilitate oversight of large 
orders of opioid medications.94  
The DOJ achieved a similar result using the same theory of liability against 
another major pharmaceutical distributor: McKesson Corporation.95 McKesson 
was originally investigated in 2008 and entered an agreement to pay a civil 
penalty for reporting violations.96 McKesson continued to violate CSA 
reporting duties, however, particularly with regards to oxycodone and 
hydrocodone, giving rise to a renewed investigation.97 That investigation 
culminated in a record-setting $150 million penalty for CSA violations.98 Like 
Cardinal, McKesson faced punishment beyond just monetary fines and agreed 
to make consequential changes to its business practices.99 Most significantly, 
McKesson implemented a “first of its kind” independent monitor system 
partnership with DEA to ensure compliance.100 While McKesson’s initial 
 
 94 2012 CARDINAL MOA, supra note 91, at 3–4. Specifically, Cardinal agreed to raise 
its quality control standards and processes, create a new corporate body for monitoring large 
volume orders of regulated pharmaceuticals, comply with more stringent monthly reporting 
requirements to the DEA, and a temporary suspension of its CSA license for distributing 
narcotic medications. Id. 
 95 McKesson Agrees to Pay Record $150 Million Settlement for Failure to Report 
Suspicious Orders of Pharmaceutical Drugs, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Jan. 17, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/mckesson-agrees-pay-record-150-million-settlement-
failure-report-suspicious-orders [https://perma.cc/8L6M-P2DN] [hereinafter McKesson 
Press Release].  
 96 Id. 
 97 Id.; ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 1, 2 (2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/928476/download [https://perma.cc/ 
EAJ9-WYMU] [hereinafter MCKESSON MOA].  
 98 McKesson Press Release, supra note 95; SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE 1, 
6 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/928471/download [https:// 
perma.cc/2UL4-C7UQ]. 
 99 McKesson Press Release, supra note 95. Four McKesson distribution centers were 
subject to suspensions ranging from 1–3 years, MCKESSON MOA, supra note 97, at 5–7, and 
the company “agreed to enhanced [CSA] compliance terms for the next five years . . . [and] 
to specific, rigorous staffing and organizational improvements; periodic auditing; and 
stipulated financial penalties for failing to adhere to the compliance terms.” McKesson Press 
Release, supra note 95. 
 100 McKesson Press Release, supra note 95; see also COMPLIANCE ADDENDUM 1 (2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/928481/download [https://perma.cc/H 
9KT-J4UF]. Under the system, McKesson is subject to “enhanced compliance,” McKesson 
Press Release, supra note 95, with the CSA for a five-year period, using “customer specific” 
and geographic data to supplement its standard monthly reports. COMPLIANCE ADDENDUM, 
supra note 100, at 4. Its implementation required creation of multiple new corporate 
departments and committees for compliance, subject to special independence and 
compensation restrictions; new corporate training and ethics policies; an outside 
“Independent Review Organization,” a three-member panel of experts on pharmaceuticals 
and substance control that conducts an annual audit. See COMPLIANCE ADDENDUM, supra 
note 100, at 1, 4–17, 22–30. The system reports back to the DEA throughout each process. 
See id. at 22–30. 
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bucking of its 2008 agreement with the government is paradigmatic of the 
settlement agreement critique, this subsequent agreement illustrates the 
potential to ingrain systemic change. 
The federal government obtained several additional settlement agreements 
for CSA violations outside the distribution context that also reveal opportunities 
for meaningful accountability.101 DOJ’s $35 million settlement with 
Mallinckrodt, among the largest producers of generic oxycodone, was novel 
because it extended enforcement of CSA reporting requirements to a 
manufacturer.102 Like Cardinal and McKesson, Mallinckrodt failed to report 
“suspicious orders” to the DEA and its lackluster system for monitoring such 
orders allegedly violated its legal duties.103 Government enforcers in this 
investigation honed in on the pharmaceutical industry practice of offering 
“chargebacks”—essentially customized discounts offered to buyers based on 
downstream purchasing data.104 Because the data is provided to the 
manufacturer after the sale of regulated medications has taken place, it was 
previously not provided to the DEA in CSA reports.105 In what the DOJ termed 
a “groundbreaking” development, Mallinckrodt agreed to an unprecedented data 
sharing agreement with the DEA that includes downstream purchasing data, 
facilitating oversight on “the next level in the supply chain.”106  
The final examples of model settlement agreements come from DOJ’s 
extension of the CSA theory to the retailer space. In 2017, DOJ obtained an 
$11.75 million settlement with Costco based on monitoring violations in their 
pharmacy outlets.107 Costco pharmacies filled incomplete prescriptions, filled 
prescriptions from noncompliant practitioners, and failed to maintain proper 
records at stores and “central fill locations.”108 Like the previous agreements, 
this settlement required more than just payment: Costco invested more than 
 
 101 See generally Mallinckrodt Agrees to Pay Record $35 Million Settlement for Failure 
to Report Suspicious Orders of Pharmaceutical Drugs and for Recordkeeping Violations, 
U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 11, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/mallinckrodt-agrees-
pay-record-35-million-settlement-failure-report-suspicious-orders [https://perma.cc/ 
2X23-SXQR] [hereinafter Mallinckrodt Press Release]. 
 102 Id. (“This is the first settlement of its magnitude with a manufacturer of 
pharmaceuticals resolving nationwide claims that the company did not meet its obligations 
to detect and notify DEA of suspicious orders . . . .”). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id.; ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 1–3, 5 (2017), https:// 
www.justice.gov/usao-edmi/press-release/file/986026/download [https://perma.cc/ 
R542-69SM] [hereinafter MALLINCKRODT SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT].  
 105 See MALLINCKRODT SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, supra note 104, at 5. 
 106 Mallinckrodt Press Release, supra note 101; see also MALLINCKRODT SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT, supra note 104, at 4–9.  
 107 See Costco Wholesale to Pay $11.75 Million to Settle Allegations of Lax Pharmacy 
Controls, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/costco-
wholesale-pay-1175-million-settle-allegations-lax-pharmacy-controls [https://perma 
.cc/94E3-XS8Y].  
 108 Id. 
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$100 million in a revamped pharmacy management system to facilitate CSA 
compliance, implemented a new internal audit system requiring internal 
corporate reorganization and external cooperation, and agreed to a three year 
period of unfettered DEA access to inspect facilities.109 The same year, and 
under the same theory, DEA achieved a $3 million settlement with Safeway.110 
The investigation was triggered when DEA was tipped off to an internal theft of 
a large supply of hydrocodone.111 Finding that the practices that allowed such a 
loss to go unreported were widespread across the company’s pharmacies, DEA 
implemented similar compliance requirements as in the Costco agreement.112 
Time will tell if the behavior change strategies deployed by the federal 
government will lead to better outcomes than in previous opioid settlements. 
The strategy, however, demonstrates that settlement agreements are more than 
mere payments and penalties to dispose of a lawsuit. They are a flexible tool 
that can incorporate systemic, enforceable terms of change, bounded only by the 
thoughtfulness and willingness of the contracting parties.  
C. Priorities in an Opioid Master Settlement Agreement 
Examples of previous public health regulatory settlements provide both 
aspirational and cautionary guidance on crafting effective terms for an opioid 
MSA. It is reasonable to assume that any settlement would include both 
monetary compensation and behavior change requirements. Other residual 
benefits of this type of public health litigation—even absent a settlement—
include building public awareness about opioid harms and spurring other 
government activity, namely in the legislative and executive branches.113 This 
part, however, focuses on master settlement monetary and behavior change 
components, conceptualizing what form and substance these components could 
take to maximize public health impacts. We also briefly address several related 
questions that complicate any such MSA, including what magnitude monetary 
damages might reach, which parties may negotiate the terms of a settlement, and 
how the terms would best be enforced. 
 
 109 See id. 
 110 Safeway Pharmacies Pay $3 Million to Resolve Allegations Chain Failed to Timely 
Report Drug Diversion, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 18, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
wdwa/pr/safeway-pharmacies-pay-3-million-resolve-allegations-chain-failed-timely-
report-drug [https://perma.cc/LE6A-ZZJD].  
 111 Id. 
 112 See id.; Nate Raymond, Safeway to Pay $3 Million to Resolve U.S. Drug Probe, 
REUTERS (July 18, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safeway-probe/safeway-
to-pay-3-million-to-resolve-u-s-drug-probe-idUSKBN1A32BB [https://perma.cc/4M 
PV-LB44] (“In addition to paying $3 million, Safeway will also implement a compliance 
agreement reached with DEA to prevent future notification lapses.”). 
 113 See Haffajee & Mello, supra note 4, at 2305; Jacobson & Warner, supra note 46, at 
788–90; Parmet & Daynard, supra note 46, at 445. 
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1. Monetary Damages 
a. Damages Award Magnitude 
A settlement with the pharmaceutical industry cannot be expected to match 
the overall cost of the opioid epidemic, given that industry is only one of many 
contributing parties. However, the magnitude of overall epidemic costs provides 
benchmarks for the value of a master settlement.  
Studies estimating the economic burden of the opioid epidemic vary 
widely.114 Conservative estimates find annual costs increasing from around $75 
billion in 2013 up to almost $100 billion in 2017, for a total cost of the epidemic 
since 2001 of $1 trillion.115 More inclusive valuations find annual costs alone 
total half a trillion dollars, with compounded costs of the epidemic therefore in 
the multiple trillions.116 The economic cost studies largely cluster around these 
two poles; whether or not a given study accounts for the value of lost lives 
largely accounts for the difference in cost magnitude estimated.117 On the lower 
end, studies estimate costs by primarily valuing health care costs, looking to the 
disproportionate health care burdens imposed by people who misuse opioids 
relative to those who are similarly situated but do not.118 On the upper end, 
studies also consider economic losses, such as foregone labor and criminal 
justice system costs, and noneconomic costs arising from lost lives.119 In this 
 
 114 Compare COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE 
UNDERESTIMATED COST OF THE OPIOID CRISIS 8 (Nov. 2017) [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE 
REPORT] (finding an annual cost of $504 billion for 2015), and Laxmaiah Manchikanti et al., 
Opioid Epidemic in the United States, 15 PAIN PHYSICIAN ES9, ES10 (2012) (stating that 
Americans with persistent pain issues impose “financial costs ranging from $560 billion to 
$635 billion per year”), with Curtis S. Florence et al., The Economic Burden of Prescription 
Opioid Overdose, Abuse, and Dependence in the United States, 2013, 54 MED. CARE 901, 
904 (2016) (estimating annual costs for 2013 at $78.5 billion), and Corey Rhyan, The 
Potential Societal Benefit of Eliminating the Opioid Crisis Exceeds $95 Billion per Year, 
ALTARUM (Nov. 16, 2017), https://altarum.org/sites/default/files/uploaded-publication-
files/Research-Brief_Opioid-Epidemic-Economic-Burden.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3 
TN-UJ9M] (finding 2016 annual costs total around $95 billion dollars). 
 115 See sources cited supra note 114; Corey Rhyan, Economic Toll of Opioid Crisis in 
U.S. Exceeded $1 Trillion Since 2001, ALTARUM (Feb. 13, 2018), https://alterum 
.org/news/economic-toll-opioid-crisis-us-exceeded-1-trillion-2001 [https://perma.cc/ 
3WL8-NVNC].  
 116 See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 114, at 8. 
 117 See id. at 3 (“Previous studies and estimates fail to fully account for the lives lost to 
overdose.”). 
 118 See Carrie McAdam-Marx et al., Costs of Opioid Abuse and Misuse Determined from 
a Medicaid Database, 24 J. PAIN & PALLIATIVE CARE PHARMACOTHERAPY 5, 6 (2010). 
 119 See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 114, at 3 (“Studies that only include 
healthcare expenditures typically capture none of the value of lives lost, and studies that 
account for earnings losses among those who die account for only a fraction of the loss from 
such mortality. . . . As earnings do not take into account other valuable activities in life 
besides work.”); Howard G. Birnbaum et al., Estimated Costs of Prescription Opioid 
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latter category of studies that value lost lives, productivity losses from opioid 
fatalities represent the majority of the epidemic’s costs.120 By 2015, for 
example, 2 million “prime-age” workers were inactive due to opioid use, 
slowing economic growth by 0.6% and costing the economy an estimated $1.6 
trillion.121 The next greatest categories of costs are productivity losses from 
nonfatal opioid misuse, health care costs related directly to overdoses, indirect 
health care costs, criminal justice system administration, child and family 
assistance, and losses to the education system.122 
When costs are broken down by sector of the economy, studies show that 
individuals and the private sector bear the majority of the burden, followed by 
the federal government, then by state and then local governments.123 This 
breakdown finds that the federal, state, and local government portion of the 
burden has held at roughly half of costs per year, including half of the $95.8 
billion cost in 2016 alone.124 Compounded since 2001, this constitutes 
approximately $500 billion of the $1 trillion total costs—only projected to 
exponentially grow in the coming years.125 Because the plaintiffs in the current 
wave of opioid litigation are typically the government itself, this metric could 
be a useful barometer for master settlement negotiations, assuming most or all 
government plaintiffs come to the table.126 Added to this $500 billion from 
 
Analgesic Abuse in the United States in 2001: A Societal Perspective, 22 CLINICAL J. PAIN 
667, 671–73 (2006); Howard G. Birnbaum et al., Societal Costs of Prescription Opioid 
Abuse, Dependence, and Misuse in the United States, 12 PAIN MED. 657, 661–62 (2011); 
Florence et al., supra note 114, at 902–03; Ryan N. Hansen et al., Economic Costs of 
Nonmedical Use of Prescription Opioids, 27 CLINICAL J. PAIN 194, 195–98 (2011); Ben 
Gitis, State-by-State: The Labor Force and Economic Effects of the Opioid Crisis, AM. 
ACTION F. (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.americanactionforum.org/project/opioid-state-
summary/ [https://perma.cc/5ZCE-56Z2]. 
 120 See Rhyan, supra note 115.  
 121 Gitis, supra note 119. 
 122 See Rhyan, supra note 115. 
 123 Id. (finding the individual costs are predominantly from lost wages; private sector 
from health care costs; federal, state, and local governments from additional expenditures on 
health care, social services, education, and criminal justice, as well as lost tax revenue).  
 124 See id. 
 125 See id. 
 126 Indeed, even though the United States is not a party to the opioid MDL, it is formally 
participating in settlement negotiations as a designated “friend of the Court.” See United 
States’ Motion to Participate in Settlement Discussions and as Friend of the Court at 1, In re 
Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 02, 2018) (unopposed 
motion approved by Judge Polster on June 19, 2018); United States’ Memorandum in 
Support of Its Motion to Participate in Settlement Discussions and as Friend of the Court at 
3, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804 (N.D. Oh. Apr. 02, 2018) (“The 
United States’ substantial financial stake in combatting the opioid epidemic has implications 
for the proper allocation of any monetary settlement of the claims asserted in the multi-
district litigation.”); Statement of Interest of the United States at 3, In re Nat’l Prescription 
Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804 (N.D. Oh. Mar. 01, 2018) [hereinafter Statement of 
Interest] (justifying the federal government’s interest in the MDL by pointing to “substantial 
costs from the opioid epidemic,” including the 2013 single-year estimate of total costs as 
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2001–2017 is the projected $250 billion from 2017–2020 incurred by 
governments—for a cumulative total of about $750 billion.127 And this figure 
does not take into account future costs beyond 2020, which could be quite 
substantial, or individual costs that could be factored into a settlement as 
discussed in Part III.C.1.b.128 In short, a realistic figure for the master settlement 
could reasonably reach at least $50 billion to hundreds of billions, similar to the 
tobacco MSA, if shared responsibility, other defenses, or bankruptcy threats do 
not reduce that sum substantially.129 
b. Compensating the “Injured Parties” 
Compensatory damages awarded in tort litigation are classically understood 
to serve competing goals: compensation, deterrence, and punishment or 
corrective justice.130 In the public health and regulatory contexts, litigation 
damages are often also relied on by legislatures and executive agencies as a 
means for private enforcement of public regulations and mass injuries.131 As in 
the tobacco litigation, the opioid litigation conceives of addiction to opioids as 
a kind of “mass” injury not unlike asbestos exposure, damages compensation 
for which shifts the costs of injuries from victims to responsible parties.132 As 
 
$78.5 billion and citing the Council of Economic Advisors’ upper-end estimate, supra note 
114). 
 127 See Rhyan, supra note 114. 
 128 Even estimates that place greater emphasis on the value of human life might more 
representatively quantify the true societal impact of the epidemic but are likely untenable in 
the context of a litigation resolution. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 114, at 3–5 
(noting that many federal administrative agencies each have unique metrics for valuing 
human life, that the superiority of any given method is contested, and that even the number 
of lives lost to opioids is itself uncertain).  
 129 See Harris et al., supra note 40 (estimating an MDL settlement to reach $50 billion). 
 130 Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and 
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1801 (1997) (describing the “major camps of tort 
scholars,” some seeing “tort liability as an instrument aimed largely at the goal of deterrence, 
commonly explained within the framework of economics,” and for others seeing “tort law 
as a way of achieving corrective justice between the parties”). 
 131 See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public 
Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 854 (1984) (“Although Congress 
and the states have enacted a host of regulatory programs in recent years, most of these 
programs delegate a significant portion of the public enforcement burden to private damage 
actions. . . . Such actions are . . . the sole means by which victims of mass exposure accidents 
may recover for their losses.”).  
 132 See Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 741, 753–62 (2003) (describing how the tobacco litigation relied on an 
innovative “public nuisance” theory); David Schwartz et al., Opioid Litigation: What’s on 
the Horizon, LAW360 (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/955070/opioid-
litigation-what-s-on-the-horizon [on file with Ohio State Law Journal] (“Some have even 
forecast that [the opioid litigation] could be a mass tort the size of Vioxx or other high-profile 
cases”).  
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in mass tort regulatory litigation, an opioid settlement should seek to achieve 
meaningful compensation for injured parties.133 
Here, determining who is “injured” is not straightforward. The government 
plaintiffs represent and litigate on behalf of their constituents, but the injuries 
they allege are to public coffers and the public welfare.134 This was the case in 
the tobacco litigation, where the attorneys general used costs to state Medicaid 
systems to finally force the tobacco industry to the negotiating table, and where 
the MSA payments were negotiated to remedy the states’ injuries.135 Even 
though pursuing government injuries provides a promising vehicle for 
successfully holding opioid industry actors accountable, private parties ought 
not be excluded from compensation considerations. The tobacco MSA teaches 
that state awards are unlikely to trickle down to the pocketbooks of the very 
individuals most directly injured by industry’s wrongdoing.136 And as 
aforementioned, individual costs from the opioid epidemic are substantial, 
estimated to roughly equal total government costs.137  
Therefore, an opioid MSA, if negotiated successfully and equitably, would 
take a bifurcated approach to compensation. Ideally, a settlement award would 
be split between negotiated payments to the government plaintiffs and a system 
for direct compensation of injured individuals.138 Articulating detailed 
 
 133 Though, it is worth noting, even money going solely to state coffers would not be 
“wasted,” given that money is fungible and the crisis has directly impacted many state and 
local governments’ bottom lines. See Paula Seligson & Tim Reid, Unbudgeted: How the 




 134 See Statement of Interest, supra note 126, at 3–4. 
 135 Parmet & Daynard, supra note 46, at 440 (“[T]he attorneys general sought 
compensation for the costs of smoking-related illnesses paid by the states . . . .”).  
 136 See Margaret A. Little, A Most Dangerous Indiscretion: The Legal, Economic, and 
Political Legacy of the Governments’ Tobacco Litigation, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1143, 1191–92 
(2001) (“[S]cholars have frankly acknowledged that the government’s temptation to eat the 
citizens’ lunch may be irresistible . . . [and] the government’s interference with its citizens’ 
compensatory claims . . . will violate the legal rights of the individual victims . . . .” (internal 
quotations omitted)); John Dunbar, Tobacco Settlement Helps Everyone but Smokers, CTR. 
FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Dec. 8, 2000), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2000/ 
12/08/3249/tobacco-settlement-helps-everyone-but-smokers [https://perma.cc/XZ2R-
3Q4A] (last updated May 19, 2014).  
 137 See Rhyan, supra note 115.  
 138 Canada’s opioid litigation provides an example. There, when consolidated consumer 
class actions against Purdue Pharma settled for $20 million (Canadian), the settlement 
agreement provided that after a $1 million payment to insurers, the remaining $19 million 
would be divided among affected members of the public who are approved for compensation 
by an appointed claims administrator. See OXYCONTIN AND OXYNEO NATIONAL 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 15 (Mar. 8, 2017) (Can.), http://www.siskinds.com/cms 
files/PDF/Pharmaceutical/Oxycontin/Oxy_Settlement_Agreement_Signed_March-8-
17.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4SQ-J73E] [hereinafter CANADIAN SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT]. 
The compensation program has not yet been implemented, as courts in each province had to 
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guidelines for either scheme is beyond the scope of this Article, but past 
missteps can help avoid future ones. Unlike in the tobacco MSA negotiations, 
the federal government could lead any comprehensive opioid MSA 
negotiations, be it as a party to the MDL or in its current capacity as a party to 
settlement negotiations.139 The tobacco negotiations, which took place in a 
hurried and high-pressure context, illustrated the risk that state self-interests 
predominate over more targeted resolutions designed to serve tort litigation 
goals.140 The federal government’s involvement in a more measured negotiating 
environment could assist with alleviating conflicts of interest.  
Individual compensatory schemes also raise a myriad of complex, though 
not insurmountable, issues related to fairness and administrability. An opioid 
victim’s compensation fund overseen by a specially formed administrative body 
is an excellent option, and would not be without precedent.141 Carefully crafted 
causation and evidentiary standards could ensure that injured applicants are not 
blocked from compensation if they misused their medications, while also 
warding off illegitimate claims and ensuring fairness for the pharmaceutical 
companies paying into the fund.142 Depending on the category of claimant and 
 
independently approve the settlement, and a Saskatchewan court denied approval pending 
revisions. See Perdikaris v. Purdue Pharma, 2018 SKQB 86, ¶¶ 71–72 (Can. Sask. Q.B.). 
 139 See supra note 126 and accompanying text; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO-01-
851, TOBACCO SETTLEMENT: STATES’ USE OF MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT PAYMENTS 
10 (2001) (describing how an “earlier more far-reaching proposal[,]” which would have 
created a fund for the states administered by the federal government, fell through, leaving 
“states [to] resume[] negotiations” that led to the MSA, a “scaled-down version [that] did 
not require federal action to be implemented”). 
 140 See Dreveskracht, supra note 47, at 295–96 (2015) (describing how “a hurried three 
months of negotiations” led to the original 1997 settlement proposal, followed by the 1998 
proposal that allowed for “non-settling states to participate . . . if they opted in within seven 
days—a time limit that ‘offered almost no opportunity for public health critics to mount an 
effective response’ and ‘placed overwhelming economic and political pressure on attorneys 
general [sic] to join’”) (quoting ALLAN BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY: THE RISE, FALL, 
AND DEADLY PERSISTENCE OF THE PRODUCT THAT DEFINED AMERICA 431 (2007)). 
 141 For example, the Canadian Settlement Agreement includes procedures for an 
administrative system for evaluating claims and assigning compensatory value to different 
injuries. CANADIAN SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, supra note 138, at 36–44 (attaching Exhibit 
B, the Compensation Protocol, and Schedule A, the Claims Administration Protocol). The 
compensation protocol assigns applicants “points” based on their alleged injuries (Fatal 
overdose, 500 points; non-fatal overdose, 150 points; loss of custody of children, 100 points; 
loss of employment, 10–100 points based on income level; etc.), and the claims 
administration protocol provides guidelines for evaluating the sufficiency of an applicant’s 
evidence. Id.; see also Jon D. Hanson et al., Smokers’ Compensation: Toward a Blueprint 
for Federal Regulation of Cigarette Manufacturers, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 519, 535–50 (1998) 
(providing “real-world” models of compensation fund programs). 
 142 See generally Michael R. Abrams, Note, Renovations Needed: The FDA’s 
Floor/Ceiling Framework, Preemption, and the Opioid Epidemic, 117 MICH. L. REV. 143, 
167–71 (2018) (outlining broadly a proposal for an Opioid Epidemic victim’s compensation 
fund and surveying the administrative questions involved). See also Linda S. Mullenix & 
Kristen B. Stewart, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: Fund Approaches to 
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injury (wrongful death claim on behalf of victim’s estate? healthy claimant 
seeking compensation for lost wages or health care costs? claimant presently 
seeking addiction services?), payment could take the form of direct monetary 
awards or subsidized services.143 Indeed, similar proposals were put forward as 
resolutions to the tobacco litigation prior to the MSA’s implementation.144 The 
task of designing such a system, and formulating a government payment scheme 
that is sufficiently proscribed, is surely immense, but the result is vital for 
obtaining a litigation resolution that is directly tied to the crisis harms. 
c. Allocation of Settlement Funds  
Because the opioid crisis is ongoing and only worsening as measured by the 
prevalence and severity of many associated harms, Judge Polster has articulated 
the sage intention to carefully allocate potential settlement resources, including 
funds, in the negotiation process.145 He hopes to meaningfully abate the opioid 
crisis now and going forward, rather than simply repair past harms.146 Uniquely, 
he views comprehensive settlement as a vehicle to sweep aside procedural 
formalities and defenses inherent in litigation, and instead focus efforts on 
maximizing public health impact.147 He sees the judiciary’s role in the MDL as 
remedying perceived failures among other government branches to adequately 
address the crisis.148 
So, what should an abatement fund designed to mitigate opioid nuisances 
prioritize? Adopting an epidemiological framework for public health harm 
prevention at three levels of exposure is helpful in prioritizing fund allocation. 
First, resources can be allocated to primary and secondary prevention, or 
towards preventing harms prior to individual opioid exposure or when 
individuals have been exposed but have not yet developed the disease of 
addiction, respectively.149 Second, albeit more pressingly, resources can be 
 
Resolving Mass Tort Litigation, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 121, 126−150 (2002) (contrasting the 
causation and evidentiary approaches of major compensation funds); Palma J. Strand, Note, 
The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Example of 
Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REV. 575, 608–18 (1983) 
(proposing an administrative compensation scheme for victims of toxic waste, using a 
“probabilistic causation approach”). 
 143 See Abrams, supra note 142, at 169. 
 144 See Richard C. Ausness, Compensation for Smoking-Related Injuries: An Alternative 
to Strict Liability in Tort, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1085, 1124–33 (1990); Donald W. Garner, 
Cigarettes and Welfare Reform, 26 EMORY L.J. 269, 314–21 (1977); Hanson et al., supra 
note 141, at 553–56.  
 145 See generally Hoffman, supra note 36 (exploring the broad variety of resources 
Judge Polster is considering while exploring an opiate settlement). 
 146 See id.  
 147 See id. 
 148 See id. 
 149 See generally Andrew Kolodny et al., The Prescription Opioid and Heroin Crisis: A 
Public Health Approach to an Epidemic of Addiction, 18 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 559, 565–
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allocated to tertiary prevention efforts, or those that seek to prevent further harm 
to individuals in which opioid use disorders are firmly entrenched.150 These 
tertiary prevention efforts aim to prevent overdose, progression of disease, and 
other adverse life outcomes resulting from addiction.151  
Allocation of funds into tertiary prevention efforts will address many acute, 
severe harms of the epidemic, where an infusion of money intelligently 
allocated and on a magnitude not yet invested by the federal government and 
states could quickly save lives and avoid serious harms.152 First, opioid 
overdose deaths have risen dramatically since 2000; from 2012 to 2016, these 
deaths increased 80% to reach 42,249 deaths (or almost 116 persons per day).153 
Indications suggest that opioid-specific deaths maintained or increased further 
in 2017–2018.154 The most direct way to avert these deaths is by making 
naloxone, the opioid overdose-reversal drug which is highly effective when 
administered quickly, more widely available.155 Many states and communities 
have already expanded access to naloxone by equipping first responders, family, 
and friends with the drug.156 As well, Medicaid and other insurance expansions 
have made coverage for the product more robust and are correlated with 
decreased harms.157 Nevertheless, access is still woefully inadequate—
particularly given that the opioid overdoses attributable to synthetic fentanyl 
have increased most dramatically since 2012 (675% increase) and require a 
 
69 (2015) (defining primary and secondary prevention strategies in the context of opiates); 
Rebecca L. Haffajee, Preventing Opioid Misuse with Prescription Drug Monitoring 
Programs: A Framework for Evaluating the Success of State Public Health Laws, 67 
HASTINGS L.J. 1621, 1631–34 (2016) (applying the primary and secondary prevention 
strategies described by Kolodny); John Strang et al., Drug Policy and the Public Good: 
Evidence for Effective Interventions, 379 LANCET 71 (2012) (describing similar holistic 
solutions to opioid addiction). 
 150 Rebecca L. Haffajee & Richard G. Frank, Making the Opioid Public Health 
Emergency Effective, 75 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 767, 767 (2018).  
 151 Kolodny et al., supra note 149, at 568–69. 
 152 See SUPPORT Act, supra note 13; THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON COMBATING 
DRUG ADDICTION & THE OPIOID CRISIS 8, 37–39 (2017). 
 153 Haffajee & Frank, supra note 150, at 768 (2018); see Seth et al., supra note 3, at 349. 
 154 See sources cited supra note 1. 
 155 Haffajee & Frank, supra note 150, at 767. 
 156 Id.; see also Rahi Abouk et al., Association Between State Laws Facilitating 
Pharmacy Distribution of Naloxone and Risk of Fatal Overdose, 179 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 
805, 806 (2019).  
 157 See Lisa Clemans-Cope & Marni Epstein, Medicaid-Covered Opioid Overdose and 
Treatment Drugs Reveal the Growth of the Opioid Crisis, URB. INST. (Mar. 27, 2018), 
https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/medicaid-covered-opioid-overdose-and-treatment 
-drugs-reveal-growth-opioid-crisis [https://perma.cc/X5JQ-VJVL]; Richard G. Frank et 
al., Does Naloxone Availability Increase Opioid Abuse? The Case for Skepticism, HEALTH 
AFF. (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180316.599  
095/full/ [https://perma.cc/3ECF-RAJT]; Richard G. Frank & Carrie Fry, Medicaid 
Expands Access to Lifesaving Naloxone, COMMONWEALTH FUND (July 5, 2017), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2017/medicaid-expands-access-lifesaving-
naloxone [https://perma.cc/8AJQ-S24Y]. 
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naloxone dose at least five times greater than that typically available to be 
successfully reversed.158 Conservatively estimating that about fifteen naloxone 
doses dispensed result in one life saved159—and given the statistics that between 
2.1 and 6 million Americans have an opioid use disorder (OUD),160 almost 
150,000 emergency department visits were due to opioid overdoses in 2017,161 
and almost 48,000 opioid overdoses resulted in deaths in 2017162—likely 
millions of additional doses of naloxone are needed at costs that overwhelm 
states and localities.163 Substantial amounts of settlement funds could go 
towards these costs, with the federal and allied state governments potentially 
stepping in to negotiate lower prices than the persistently high prices for 
naloxone.164  
Another ripe opportunity for tertiary prevention fund investment is 
evidence-based opioid addiction therapy, particularly to rural areas. Only 20% 
to 40% of the millions with OUD receive addiction treatment, a fraction of 
whom receive evidence-based treatment.165 A combination of medication and 
behavioral therapy, or medication-assisted treatment (MAT), is considered the 
gold standard for treating OUDs.166 Clinical trials have demonstrated that three 
medications for OUD (MOUD)—methadone, buprenorphine, and extended 
release naltrexone—reduce opioid use, overdose, and other adverse health 
 
 158 Haffajee & Frank, supra note 150, at 767–68. 
 159 Frank & Fry, supra note 157. 
 160 See Sarun Charumilind et al., Why We Need Bolder Action to Combat the Opioid 
Epidemic, MCKINSEY & CO. (Sept. 2018), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/ 
healthcare-systems-and-services/our-insights/why-we-need-bolder-action-to-combat-
the-opioid-epidemic [https://perma.cc/JD64-34PD]; Key Substance Use and Mental 
Health Indicators in the United States: Results from the 2017 National Survey on Drug Use 
and Health, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERV. ADMIN. (Sept. 2018), 
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/cbhsq-reports/NSDUHFFR2017/NS 
DUHFFR2017.htm [https://perma.cc/3XKF-M3L3]. 
 161 See Alana M. Vivolo-Kantor et al., Vital Signs: Trends in Emergency Department 
Visits for Suspected Opioid Overdoses—United States, July 2016-September 2017, 67 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 279, 281 (2018).  
 162 Drug Overdose Deaths, supra note 2. 
 163 Haffajee & Frank, supra note 150, at 767. 
 164 See Ravi Gupta et al., The Rising Price of Naloxone—Risks to Efforts to Stem 
Overdose Deaths, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2213, 2214–15 (2016); Frank & Fry, supra note 
157.  
 165 See Anna Lembke & Jonathan H. Chen, Use of Opioid Agonist Therapy for Medicare 
Patients in 2013, 73 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 990, 991 (2016); Brendan Saloner & Shankar 
Karthikeyan, Changes in Substance Abuse Treatment Use Among Individuals with Opioid 
Use Disorders in the United States, 2004–2013, 314 JAMA 1515, 1515 (2015). 
 166 See Robert P. Schwartz et al., Opioid Agonist Treatments and Heroin Overdose 
Deaths in Baltimore, Maryland, 1995–2009, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 917, 920–21 (2013) 
(finding that “increased access to [buprenorphine, a drug often used for MAT,] . . . may have 
significantly contributed to the reduction in heroin overdose deaths [in Baltimore]”); Lembke 
& Chen, supra note 165, at 990 (discussing the efficacy of MAT-related therapy). 
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outcomes.167 For example, methadone and buprenorphine treatment were 
associated with 53% and 37% reductions, respectively, in all-cause mortality 
among patients with OUD as compared to those receiving no MOUD in the 
twelve months following nonfatal overdose.168 However, rural areas are 
particularly lacking in MAT and MOUD providers, with a majority of rural 
counties still lacking a physician with a buprenorphine waiver,169 and many 
more lacking a methadone provider.170 Also particularly lacking in robust MAT 
are criminal justice settings,171 including when patients transition out of these 
settings and are at vastly increased risks for overdose.172 
Barriers to more robust opioid addiction treatment abound and notably 
involve a lack of behavioral health and primary care practitioners willing or 
trained to provide this treatment.173 But funding could directly address many of 
 
 167 See Richard P. Mattick et al., Buprenorphine Maintenance Versus Placebo or 
Methadone Maintenance for Opioid Dependence, 2014 COCHRANE DATABASE SYSTEMATIC 
REVS. 1, 19–20; Richard P. Mattick et al., Methadone Maintenance Therapy Versus No 
Opioid Replacement Therapy for Opioid Dependence, 2009 COCHRANE DATABASE 
SYSTEMATIC REVS. 1, 10–11; Suzanne Nielsen et al., Opioid Agonist Treatment for Patients 
with Dependence on Prescription Opioids, 317 JAMA 967, 967 (2017); Suzanne Nielsen et 
al., Opioid Agonist Treatment for Pharmaceutical Opioid Dependent People, 2016 
COCHRANE DATABASE SYSTEMATIC REV.S 1, 23; Schwartz et al., supra note 166, at 920. See 
generally Marc A. Schuckit, Review Article, Treatment of Opioid-Use Disorders, 375 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 357, 361−366 (2016) (surveying MOUD treatments and efficacies). 
 168 Marc. R. Larochelle et al., Medication for Opioid Use Disorder After Nonfatal 
Opioid Overdose and Association with Mortality: A Cohort Study, 169 ANNALS INTERNAL 
MED. 137, 140 (2018). 
 169 C. Holly A. Andrilla et al., Geographic Distribution of Providers with a DEA Waiver 
to Prescribe Buprenorphine for the Treatment of Opioid Use Disorder: A 5-Year Update, 35 
J. RURAL HEALTH 108, 110 (2018); see also Rebecca L. Haffajee et al., Characteristics of 
U.S. Counties with High Opioid Overdose Mortality and Low Capacity to Deliver 
Medications for Opioid Use Disorder, 2 JAMA NETWORK OPEN e196373, at e196373 
(2019). 
 170 See Haffajee et al., supra note 169, at e196373; Rebecca L. Haffajee et al., Policy 
Pathways to Address Provider Workforce Barriers to Buprenorphine Treatment, 54 AM. J. 
PREVENTIVE MED. S230, S232–33 (2018); Jeffrey H. Samet et al., Perspective, Methadone 
in Primary Care—One Small Step for Congress, One Giant Leap for Addiction Treatment, 
379 NEW ENG. J. MED. 7, 8 (2018). 
 171 Sarah E. Wakeman & Josiah D. Rich, Addiction Treatment Within U.S. Correctional 
Facilities: Bridging the Gap Between Current Practice and Evidence-Based Care, 34 J. 
ADDICTIVE DISEASES 220, 221 (2015). 
 172 Josiah D. Rich et al., Methadone Continuation Versus Forced Withdrawal on 
Incarceration in a Combined US Prison and Jail: A Randomised, Open-Label Trial, 386 
LANCET 350, 351 (2015). 
 173 See Brendan Saloner et al., Moving Addiction Care to the Mainstream—Improving 
the Quality of Buprenorphine Treatment, 379 NEW ENG. J. MED. 4, 4 (2018); Samet et al., 
supra note 170, at 7. See generally Haffajee et al., supra note 170, at S237–38 (addressing 
barriers for many healthcare providers to provide buprenorphine treatment); Sarah E. 
Wakeman & Michael L. Barnett, Primary Care and the Opioid-Overdose Crisis—
Buprenorphine Myths and Realities, 379 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1 (2018) (providing solutions 
for mobilizing primary care providers to offer buprenorphine). 
730  OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 80:4 
these barriers and expand treatment by financing: public payer coverage of 
MAT;174 provider incentives to practice in rural areas;175 clinician time and fees 
associated with MAT training;176 updated curriculum changes in graduate and 
continuing medical education around opioid prescribing and addiction 
treatment;177 infrastructure to provide MAT via telemedicine (assuming 
regulatory hurdles are overcome) and/or integrated care models;178 and robust 
MAT provisions in criminal justice settings and upon transition into society.179 
Additional financial investments that would address downstream harms 
involve reducing the incidence of infectious disease transmissions—an 
increasingly common comorbidity that accompanies opioid injection use.180 For 
instance, Hepatitis C infections nationally, which had enjoyed a steady decline 
of 87% between 1992 and 2009, increased by 167% since 2010.181 Outbreaks 
of HIV have also been connected to the opioid crisis,182 for instance to injecting 
Opana in Scott County, Indiana.183 These infections could be prevented or 
minimized with clean syringes (including at safe injection facilities),184 MAT, 
and increased surveillance/detection efforts—all of which cost money.185 For 
example, providing the approximately 700,000 persons with heroin use 
disorders who are potentially injecting with clean needles would cost $14 
million per year.186 Establishing safe injection facilities would be more 
controversial and costly,187 but these facilities have been shown in a number of 
studies to reduce the incidence of infectious diseases and minimize overdose 
harms.188 
 
 174 Haffajee et al., supra note 170, at S234–37; Emma Sandoe et al., Policy Levers that 
States Can Use to Improve Opioid Addiction Treatment and Address the Opioid Epidemic, 
HEALTH AFF. (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog  
20180927.51221/full/ [https://perma.cc/5KZ9-2URZ]. 
 175 Haffajee et al., supra note 170, at S238. 
 176 See id. at S236. 
 177 Id. at S238. 
 178 Haffajee & Frank, supra note 150, at 768; Y. Tony Yang et al., Commentary, 
Telemedicine’s Role in Addressing the Opioid Epidemic, 93 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 1177, 1180 
(2018). 
 179 Wakeman & Rich, supra note 171, at 223. 
 180 Haffajee & Frank, supra note 150, at 767. 
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 182 Gregg S. Gonsalves & Forrest W. Crawford, Dynamics of the HIV Outbreak and 
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(2018). 
 183 See Philip J. Peters et al., HIV Infection Linked to Injection Use of Oxymorphone in 
Indiana, 2014–2015, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 229, 230 (2016). 
 184 See Jennifer Ng et al., Does Evidence Support Supervised Injection Sites?, 63 
CANADIAN FAM. PHYSICIAN 866, 866 (2017); Gonsalves & Crawford, supra note 182. 
 185 Haffajee & Frank, supra note 150, at 767–68. 
 186 Id. at 767. 
 187 See id.  
 188 See Jennifer Ng et al., supra note 184, at 866; German Lopez, A Study Questioning 
the Evidence for Safe Injection Sites Has Been Retracted, VOX (Aug. 22, 2018), 
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Finally, to reduce tertiary harms, settlement money could help support the 
growing number of children affected by opioid overdose and misuse.189 After 
declining by almost 30% from 1999 to 2012, foster care rates have increased 
from 2012 to 2016 nationally by approximately 7%.190 Most evidence from 
foster care administrators suggests this increase is largely attributable to parents 
with opioid addiction, some of whom overdose fatally, who are no longer able 
to care for their children.191 As well, money could be invested into providing 
supports to reunite families torn apart by opioid addiction—including therapy, 
MAT, housing, and job supports for parents affected. Treatment for pregnant 
and postpartum mothers and babies with neonatal opioid withdrawal syndrome 
was addressed in the SUPPORT Act.192  
Evidence-based upstream harm prevention efforts also are reasonable 
candidates for MSA fund allocation. These could include money for prescription 
drug monitoring programs (PDMP) that embody features shown to reduce high-
risk opioid prescribing and even overdoses,193 including building in technology 
to make referrals to addiction treatment providers and training providers to react 
to PDMP information without turning patients away.194 Pain clinic regulation is 
also a viable candidate for fund infusion, where the evidence shows that when 
enforced, these laws reduce high-risk prescribing.195  
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(forthcoming 2019).  
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Opioid Prescribing, Dispensing, and Use Outcomes: A Systematic Review, J. PAIN 
(forthcoming 2019). See generally Rebecca L. Haffajee, Prescription Drug Monitoring 
Programs: Friend or Folly in Addressing the Opioid Overdose Crisis, 381 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
699, 699–701 (2019).  
 195 See Tatyana Lyapustina et al., Effect of a “Pill Mill” Law on Opioid Prescribing and 
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Rutkow et al., Original Investigation, Effect of Florida’s Prescription Drug Monitoring 
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d. Behavior Change Requirements 
Monetary relief is essential for offsetting the epidemic’s considerable 
economic burden, but a master settlement’s injunctive terms are just as vital. 
Monetary relief alone is likely incapable of reversing upwards trends of opioid 
addiction and overdose.196 The only major settlement from the first wave of 
opioid litigation was largely inconsequential,197 perhaps in part due its 
uninspired behavior change provisions. Any comprehensive settlement to the 
opioid litigation should include provisions that ensure transparency, monitoring, 
and enforceability.  
One challenge that injunctive terms can remedy is the general opacity that 
surrounds government settlement agreements.198 While funds secured through 
the work of the DOJ may be subject to disclosure requirements, state victories 
are generally less transparent.199 Because settlement agreements are typically 
not published on public litigation dockets, discovering the exact terms agreed to 
between a state attorney general’s office and a corporate defendant can be 
challenging.200 Interested parties are often left only with press releases 
announcing that an agreement was reached, which may be skewed in the 
 
Program and Pill Mill Laws on Opioid Prescribing and Use, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 
1642, 1646–48 (2015). 
 196 See Carr et al., supra note 11, at 210 (arguing that a monetary penalty’s most likely 
impact is increased pricing, but “such a result is unlikely to substantially affect opioid-related 
morbidity and mortality because health insurers, not consumers, pay most prescription drug 
costs”). 
 197 See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.  
 198 David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 
2648 (1995) (“Parties consummate settlements out of public view. The facts on which they 
are based remain unknown, their responsiveness to third parties who they may affect is at 
best dubious, and the goods they create are privatized and not public. Settlements are 
opaque.”). 
 199 W. VA. GOVERNOR’S REPORT, supra note 72, at 7 (explaining that “federal asset 
forfeiture funds are distinct from the settlement funds that were collected by the West 
Virginia Attorney General’s Office” and that the spending plans for the former category of 
funds were being publicly outlined, while the latter were not, because of “strict U.S. 
Department of Justice guidelines”). Even at the federal level, however, settlement 
transparency remains a problematic area giving rise to reform efforts. See Senators Warren 
and Lankford Introduce Truth in Settlements Act to Increase Transparency of Federal 




 200 See Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public 
Dimensions of Court-Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 555 (2006) 
(explaining that litigation dockets may not reflect that settlement was reached because rules 
of procedure allow parties to “conclude agreements by dismissals,” meaning they arrive at a 
mutually agreeable resolution to the litigation, unilaterally file notices of dismissal with the 
court, and then outside of court “specify the relevant terms in contracts”).  
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direction of flattering the party volunteering the information.201 In other cases, 
nondisclosure provisions in the agreement may very well prohibit publication 
of the terms.202 While the settlement terms themselves would reveal whether the 
funds were restricted to certain policy initiatives, that information is only useful 
to the extent that the funding can be traced, another impossible task if funds are 
liquidated into a state’s general treasury. Any future opioid settlements could 
improve upon past agreements simply by including disclosure provisions for the 
agreements themselves and for expenditures of the funds. 
Relatedly, a comprehensive settlement should include provisions allowing 
for public monitoring and enforcement of the agreement’s requirement(s). 
DOJ’s recent series of opioid settlements demonstrate how the agreements can 
require the creation of new corporate bodies dedicated to monitoring and 
compliance with settlement terms.203 Moreover, the second wave settlements 
endorse an approach closer to a judicially enforceable consent decree as opposed 
to a purely private contract agreement.204 An opioid settlement agreement 
should include a court order that would allow any state party to the agreement 
to bring a contempt of court action against any defendant that fails to fulfill its 
 
 201 See Mallinckrodt Press Release, supra note 101; McKesson Press Release, supra 
note 95. 
 202 Resnik, supra note 200, at 555 (noting that parties can “bargain for privacy/secrecy” 
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be public: “discovery confidentiality clauses are routinely included as a predicate to the 
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inaccessible.” Resnik, supra note 200, at 555–56; see also Luban, supra note 198, at 2649 
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context during the West Virginia Attorney General’s 2004 negotiations with Purdue Pharma. 
See David Armstrong, Drug Maker Thwarted Plan to Limit OxyContin Prescriptions at 
Dawn of Opioid Epidemic, STAT (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/ 
10/26/oxycontin-maker-thwarted-limits/ [https://perma.cc/Q356-9QVB] (revealing 
previously sealed court documents from the case showing that settlement without admission 
of liability allowed Purdue to conceal damaging information about marketing practices 
exchanged during discovery); see also Patrick Radden Keefe, The Family That Built an 
Empire of Pain, NEW YORKER (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/ 
2017/10/30/the-family-that-built-an-empire-of-pain [https://perma.cc/A7T5-7KZU] 
(detailing litigation between the State of Kentucky and Purdue Pharma that ended in a 
settlement that was a “coup” for Purdue, in part because “in settling, the company sealed 
from public view both [the company President]’s deposition and internal documents obtained 
through discovery”).  
 203 See generally supra notes 92–93, 98–100, 105, 108 and accompanying text 
(describing several pharmaceutical companies’ settlement agreements with compliance 
requirements that include administrative oversight mechanisms).  
 204 See, e.g., McKesson Press Release, supra note 95. 
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obligations.205 By requiring that states make public how opioid settlement funds 
are utilized, and then providing a mechanism for monitoring and enforcing the 
obligations of both the government and industry alike, an opioid master 
settlement could avoid some of the missteps of the tobacco MSA.  
Of course, a comprehensive settlement would include a myriad of behavior 
change requirements beyond the broad structural suggestions outlined here. 
Enjoinders would require strict compliance with federal laws (including the 
CSA’s reporting requirements and the FDCA’s marketing requirements), 
constrain how funds can be spent, limit marketing and lobbying tactics around 
prescription opioids (both direct-to-consumer and to professionals), and 
establish the creation of new initiatives and programs devoted towards treating 
addiction, innovation of new pain and addiction therapies, and helping with 
structural determinants of disease (e.g., housing and employment services for 
those in recovery).206 Just as the tobacco MSA ended advertising campaigns 
like “Joe Camel,” and started public service marketing projects like the “Truth” 
campaign,207 an opioid settlement should require the creation and funding of 
projects dedicated to addiction prevention and public and professional 
education.208 By ensconcing these more specifically tailored initiatives in legal 
structures that require transparency, monitoring, and enforcement, the opioid 
settlement agreement programs will be accountable to the public and true to 
their intent. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Litigation holds significant public health potential in addressing the opioid 
crisis if pursued intelligently and thoughtfully. The sheer magnitude and costs 
of opioid harms and lack of resources governments have to put or (in the case 
of the federal government) are willing to allocate towards them make clear the 
need for additional supports. Who better to contribute to these costs than 
companies that have profited tremendously from opioid analgesic sales and 
helped to create a population dependent and addicted to opioids for treatment of 
chronic pain and other conditions? The collateral damage from the influx in 
prescription opioid supply has only partially manifested and will expand into 
 
 205 See DiSarro, supra note 78, at 282–86 (noting that contempt-of-court claims can be 
adjudicated more quickly and efficiently than breach-of-contract and provide more potential 
remedies).  
 206 See id. at 286 (noting that the limitations on potential obligations in settlement 
agreements “are limited only by the creativity of the parties’ counsel and the desires of the 
settling parties”). 
 207 See Schroeder, supra note 50, at 294–95.  
 208 See ADDICTION SOLUTIONS CAMPAIGN, OPIOID SETTLEMENT PRIORITIES 5–13 (2018), 
https://addictionsolutionscampaign.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Opioid-Settle 
ment-Priorities_5.17.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/MS78-XJQT] (recommending that an 
opioid litigation settlement prioritize education campaigns on substance misuse and 
addiction, harm reduction and prevention strategies, and access to evidence-based treatment 
services). 
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the next generation as babies born with neonatal opioid withdrawal syndrome 
and children of parents with opioid addiction experience health and life costs, 
and society experiences long-term workforce deficits. While opioid 
manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies are not solely to blame, their 
liability for public health harms that governments and individuals currently and 
in the future will bear is challenging to dispute given mounting epidemiological 
evidence and internal evidence of marketing and sales practices. Nevertheless, 
even as smaller settlements and a potential MSA are forthcoming, carefully 
earmarking monetary settlement funds and outlining behavior change 
requirements (as some past opioid settlements have done) are critical steps 
towards maximizing the value and impact of this litigation endeavor.  
Of course, litigation is not a panacea. Continued efforts to achieve 
comprehensive legislative solutions to the opioid epidemic akin to and beyond 
the SUPPORT Act should be supported, along with other evidence-based and 
carefully crafted governmental and non-governmental activities. But an opioid 
MSA would not come at the opportunity cost of those efforts, as the various 
public health response fronts are not competing in a zero-sum game. Instead, an 
MSA could provide an infusion of funds and behavior changes needed to help 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: Representative Opioid Settlements & Terms: 
Manufacturer Settlements 
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Purdue; additional 
$75M donation to 
the Center directly 
from Sackler 
family; $60M in 
attorneys’ fees; 
$12.5M directly to 
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Table 2: Representative Opioid Settlements & Terms: 
Distributor Settlements 
 























violation of the 
CSA 
 
Failure to meet 
recordkeeping 
responsibilities 
under the CSA 
$44 million in total 
payments to the 
United States 
























Failure to comply 
with 2008 
agreement with 















Failure to protect 
against diversion 
of narcotic 
medication at a 
dozen distribution 
centers 












operations at four 
distribution centers 
for period of 1–3 
years 
 
Implement “first of 
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Table 3: Representative Opioid Settlements & Terms: 
Pharmacy Retailer Settlements 
 
Case Plaintiffs Defendants Allegations Settlement Terms 
(Monetary; 
Injunctive) 
































to the United States 
 
 
Invest in new 
pharmacy back-end 
management 

























track of tens of 
thousands of 
hydrocodone 









at pharmacies  
across the 
company 
Invest in new 
pharmacy back-end 
management 




audit system with 
3-years of 
unfettered access 
for DEA 
inspections 
Implement 
monitoring and 
reporting systems 
for CSA 
compliance 
 
Comply with 
heightened 
standards for 
temporary punitive 
period 
 
